University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1974

Necessity and contingency in Leibniz.
G. W. Fitch
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Fitch, G. W., "Necessity and contingency in Leibniz." (1974). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014.
2083.
https://doi.org/10.7275/v75q-9b49 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2083

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY IN LEIBNIZ

A Dissertation Presented
By

GREGORY WERNER FITCH

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September

Philosophy

1974

(c)

Gregory Werner Fitch

All Rights Reserved

1974

iii

NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY IN LEIBNIZ

A Dissertation
By

GREGORY WERNER FITCH

Approved as to style and content by:

clJLl -i
Robert

Vere

C.

Sle'igh'Jr., Ph.D., Chairman of Committee

C.

Chappell, Ph.D., Member

/)

t

Fred A. Feldman, Ph.D.

%
r

,

Member

U*

rank W. Heny, Ph.D.

Member

\14ajL C,

Vere

C.

Chappell, Ph.D., Department Head

Department of Philosophy

September

1974

Necessity and Contingency in Leibniz
Gregory W. Fitch, B.A.
M.A,

,

,

(September 1974)

Western Washington State College

University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Robert

C.

Sleigh Jr., Ph.D.

Among the objections raised against Leibniz's metaphysical views,
the problem of contingency is one of the most crucial and difficult

problems Leibniz faced.

The objection that Leibniz could not allow

for contingency in his metaphysical system was pressed on two fronts:

first, in connection with Leibniz's views on God; and second, in

connection with his analysis of truth.

The only book written by

Leibniz that was published during his lifetime, the Theodicy

,

is

Leibniz's attempt to reconcile his views on God and contingency.
Leibniz's concern over the relation between contingency and his defi-

nition of truth can be seen in the first part of the correspondence
he initiated with Arnauld.

This dissertation is an attempt to find

a solution to these problems for Leibniz.

The project, roughly speaking, is presented in three parts.

first part, which is Ghapter
as it relates to God.

I

I,

The

deals with the problem of contingency

give a brief sketch of the view

I

later

propose for Leibniz, and then see how one can account for God within
the conceptual framework given.

Various arguments for the neces-

sity of God's choice in creating this world are discussed, and three

different ways of conceiving God's role in Leibniz's metaphysical
system are considered.

While

I

point out the difficulties with each

view, I suggest that one of them is better than the other two.
the end

I

In

am forced to conclude that God did create this world of

V

necessity, but argue that God's lack of freedom does
not necessarily
rule contingency completely out of his system.
The second part, which consists of Chapters II and III,
presents

some solutions offered by contemporary philosophers to the
"analytic-

necessary" problem.

This difficulty for contingency in Leibniz arises

when we reflect on Leibniz's analysis of truth.

Leibniz claims that

in every true proposition the concept of the predicate is included

in the concept of the subject.

This makes all true propositions

analytic, and thus necessary.

G.

Parkinson and

N.

Reseller suggest

ways of resolving this problem for Leibniz, and their views are presented
in Chapter II.

Both Parkinson and Rescher believe the solution is to

be found in Leibniz's views on "infinite analysis", though each has

his own approach to the problem.

I

discuss as clearly as possible

their proposed solutions, but find them inadequate in various respects.
In Chapter III,

problem.

I

consider

B.

Mates'

interesting new approach to the

Mates presents a formal system which he believes incorporates

Leibniz's views on possible worlds, and which allows for contingency.

Much of what Mates claims seems true, and in Chapter III,

offer

Yet, because certain features of Mates'

support for some of his views.

system appear non-Leibnizian,

I

I

suggest that a better account of

Leibniz can be given.
Chapters IV and V constitute the third and final part of the
project.

In Chapter IV,

I

re-examine the "analytic-necessary" problem

in light of what has preceded

and argue that in various places, espe-

cially the Theodicy and the correspondence with Arnault, Leibniz suggests a way to resolve the problem, while keeping his definition of

vi

truth.

I

argue that Leibniz suggests we understand necessity and

contingency in terms of possible worlds and counterparts.
in mind

I

present the view more formally in Chapter V.

I

With this
discuss

various formal aspects of the system presented in Chapter V and reply
to an objection raised by Mates against the use of counterparts for

Leibniz.
I

present.

I

conclude by pointing out the relative merits of the system

vii
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God’s role in Leibniz's metaphysical system
is a main source
of difficulty for Leibniz.

B.

Russell has suggested that Leibniz's

views on God in conjunction with other views Leibniz
holds lead him
into inconsistencies 1
.

Leibniz

s

In particular, one of the major problems
is

account of contingency.

Leibniz wants to maintain that

he can allow for contingency and that he does not fall
into what has

been called 'the disease of Spinozism '.

2

In this chapter some of

the problems about God and contingency will be presented and
various

ways Leibniz might be able to avoid them will be discussed.

Leibniz's picture of creation was, briefly, that God had in his

understanding an infinite number of possible worlds.

Among all these

possible worlds God found the world which was the best and made it
actual.

But the situation is actually more complicated, and for

better understanding of Leibniz's view of creation, let us first turn
our attention to the world as it actually is.

According to Leibniz, for each substance in the world there is
a

corresponding concept, sometimes called

complete individual concept.^

a

complete concept or a

These concepts include or contain all

the properties that the substance to which the concept corresponds

has, had, or every will have.

as sets of properties.

For our purposes, we can view concepts

For example, consider Adam, the first man."*

Leibniz holds that Adam has a complete individual concept which contains
all the properties that Adam has or ever will have.

If Adam has the

property of having blond hair, then the property of having blond hair

3

is a member of Adam's complete
individual concept.
$

For any property

is a member of Adam's complete individual
concept if and only if Adam

has

Thus Adam's complete individual concept
contains all and only

$.

those properties which Adam has.

This is true for every substance.

An atomic sentence is said to be true just in
case the property
associated with the predicate is included in the
concept associated

witn the subject.
hair,

Thus, for example,

the sentence, "Adam has blond

is true because the concept of blond hair

(i.e.,

the property

of having blond hair) is included in the complete
individual concept
of Adam.
In each complete individual concept there are an infinite
number
of properties.

Moreover, for each substance there is exactly one

complete individual concept.

Suppose Adam had two distinct concepts.

If the concepts are distinct,

then they must differ with respect to

some property (say)

$.

Either Adam has

$ or

he lacks it.

has $, then the concept which does not contain

$

$

Adam

could not be Adam's

since Adam's concept must have all his properties.
then the concept which contains

If

If Adam lacks $,

could not be Adam's since that concept

contains a property which Adam lacks.

This is easy to see when we

consider this world only, but when we consider all possible worlds
the problem becomes more complicated.

For our present purposes it will be assumed that for Leibniz

each possible world is a special kind of set of complete individual
concepts.

^

The real world differs from the others in that in the

real world the concepts are realized (i.e., there is a substance cor-

responding to each concept) while in other worlds the concepts are

4

not realized.

A possible world is not just any set of concepts,
but

rather a possible world is a "collection of compossibles"

.

®

Exactly

what Leibniz meant by "compossible" is far from clear and
different

interpretations are possible.

Some philosophers have viewed compos-

sibility as a relation between two things

9
.

compossibility as a predicate of sets 10
.

But one can also view

Since there are certain

problems involved in viewing compossibility as a relation between
two things 11 we will view compossibility as a property of sets.

For

,

the moment we will say that a set of concepts is compossible just
in case all the members of the set can be realized together. 1 ^

A

possible world is a maximal compossible set of concepts.

Leibniz also believes that each concept in a world "expresses"
or "mirrors" that world.

"mirrors".

Again it is unclear what Leibniz means by

The idea is that concepts of the same world are related

to each other in such a way as to reflect the existence of each other.

For example, the concept of Adam contains the property of being married
to Eve.

Thus in some way the concept of Adam reflects the existence

of the concept of Eve (i.e., Adam could not exist if Eve did not exist

since the concept of Adam could not be realized without the concept
In a similar way the concept of Adam reflects

of Eve being realized).

all the concepts which make up this world.

Thus, the definition of

mirroring would be roughly something like the following:

a

concept

mirrors a world just in case that concept reflects every member of
that world.

A concept

C

reflects a concept D only if

it

is contra-

dictory to suppose that C is realized and D is not realized.^

5

A concept can only be a member of one possible
world.
C

were in two distinct possible worlds,

C

If a concept

would mirror a world W which

did not have as a member some concept D which

C

reflects.

Since W

is a world it must be a maximal compossible
set of concepts.

But W

can not be a maximal compossible set of concepts, because
W lacks D
as a member and C can not be realized without D.

Thus all the members

of W can not be realized together, and hence W is not a
possible world.
So,

through the use of compossibility and mirroring we get the result

that a concept is a member of only one possible world.

Viewing possible worlds as maximal compossible sets of concepts
will help us better understand God’s role in Leibniz’s metaphysics.

According to Leibniz, God could not affect which sets of concepts were
compossible.

Thus God did not create possible worlds, but rather found

them already formed in his understanding.

possible worlds he would realize, if any.

God decided which of these

God did not decide whether

Adam would sin, but decided whether to create Adam who would sin as
opposed to realizing other concepts.^

To return to our picture of

the creation, then, God decided among all these compossible sets of

concepts which set to realize, and God chose the best.
Leibniz's account of the creation and God's role in his meta-

physical system seems on the surface consistent, although there are
some obscurities.

A closer look, however, reveals certain difficulties

for Leibniz.

Leibniz believes that God has the properties of being omnipotent,
omniscient, and omnibenevolent
cient, and

.

But if God really is omnipotent, omnis-

omnibenevolent, could God have created any world less than

6

the best of all possible worlds?
is no contingency in Leibniz.

If not,

then some have argued there

Whether or not Leibniz could allow for

contingency, even with the supposition that God
necessarily created
this world, is something which

will be discussed later.

interested in whether God necessarily

We are now

created this world.

Leibniz does say that God created the best world of
necessity, but
only in a special sense of necessity.

Leibniz tries to make a dis-

tinction between two kinds of necessity.
and the other "metaphysical necessity ". 16

One he calls "moral necessity"

Metaphysical necessity for

Leibniz is what contemporary philosophers have called necessity or
logical necessity.

Something is metaphysically necessary just in case

its negation (or opposite, as Leibniz puts it) implies a contradiction.
In this sense of necessity it is not necessary that God create this

world.

However, it is morally necessary that God create the best world.

Leibniz's notion of moral necessity is not as clear as his notion of

metaphysical necessity since he never actually defines

it.

One can,

however, get some idea of what he meant.

Moral necessity for Leibniz is a kind of "hypothetical necessity".
Leibniz says something is "hypothetically necessary" when it follows
from certain free decrees of God
thing,

16
.

That is, if God decides a certain

then the results of that decision or what follows from it are

hypothetically necessary.

It is clear that Leibniz does not want to

say that Q is hypothetically necessary only if P then Q, where P is

some decree of God.

This is especially true if we understand the 'if,

then' as a material conditional.

Leibniz would want to say something

stronger, such as, if P entails Q, then Q is hypothetically necessary.

1

^

7

We might put it by saying if it is
metaphysically necessary that if P
then Q, then Q is hypothetically necessary.
a kind of

Since moral necessity is

hypothetical necessity, to say something is
morally necessary

is to say that given a certain
condition it must occur or it must be

true.

The condition seems to be one of moral
perfection. 19

Thus, for

example, to say that it is morally necessary
that God do act a is to
say that it is metaphysically necessary that
if God is morally perfect
(or acts according to moral perfection),

then God does act

a.

Leibniz

says that while God did necessarily create this world,
it is not a

necessity which destroys contingency because God’s creation
was only

morally necessary and not metaphysically necessary.

God could have

done otherwise, in the sense that his doing otherwise does not

imply

a contradiction.

Unfortunately for Leibniz, it is not at all clear that his distinction between moral and metaphysical necessity removes the difficulties about God.

If our analysis of what Leibniz means by moral

necessity is correct, then from the fact that it is morally necessary
that God created this world and an assumption about the nature of God’s

properties we can conclude that it is metaphysically necessary that
God created this world (or at least the best of all possible worlds)

Consider the following argument:
I.

(1)

It is

morally necessary that God create the best of

all possible worlds.

/..

(2)

It is metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect.

(3)

It is metaphysically necessary that God create the best

of all possible worlds.

8

Premise (1) is true according to Leibniz, 20
of Cod's nature and

(3)

(2)

seems true in virtue

does follow from (1) and (2).

We will accept

Leibniz's view that (1) is ture, although it is not clear
that Leibniz
has to hold (1).

However, it is not so clear that Leibniz holds
(2).

In the Discourse, Leibniz says:

For it would be found that this demonstration
of this predicate as belonging to Caesar is not as
absolute as are those of numbers or of geometry,

but that this predicate supposes a sequence of things
which God has shown by his free will. This sequence
is based on the first free decree of God which was
to do always that which is the most perfect and upon
the decree which God made following the first one,
regarding human nature, which is that men should
always do, although freely, that which appears to
be the best.
Now every truth which is founded upon
this kind of decree is contingent, although certain,
for the decrees of God do not change the possibilities
of things and, as I have already said, although God
assuredly chooses the best, this does not prevent
that which is less perfect from being possible in
itself.

(OC p.

22)

If we take Leibniz literally when he says that God's first free decree

was always to act in the most perfect way, then we can see why Leibniz

would deny (2).
is contingent,

Since Leibniz says that everything based on that decree
then God's acting in the most perfect way is contingent,

and thus it is not metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect.

God's being morally perfect is based on his own free decree to be

morally perfect.

Thus,

the argument is unsound and Leibniz is saved

from God's being metaphysically necessitated to create the best of all

possible worlds.

But the problem for Leibniz is not so easily solved.

In the first place,

in order for Leibniz to hold the position

suggested above he must give up a traditional view about God, namely,
that Cod by definition is morally perfect as well as omnipotent and

9

omniscient.

Traditionally, God has those attributes by
definition.

But if God is morally perfect because of a
free decree he made, then
in a metaphysical sense God could have been
less than morally perfect.
Of course, pointing out that Leibniz's views
on God are not in accord

with traditional views on God is not a criticism of his
view.

But

it is strange that Leibniz would allow that it is
possible that God
is not

morally perfect.

A more important problem for Leibniz is that

of reconciling his above account of God's moral perfection
with his

view of truth.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz said that a sentence is true just
in case the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of
the subject.

(For the purposes of this discussion, we will ignore

some difficulties of this account of truth by assuming all sentences

can be put into subject-predicate form.)

In those cases where the

referent of the subject of a sentence is a human or any other finite
substance, we can see how Leibniz's account works.

But what about God?

That is, what about sentences in which the referent of the subject
is God?

Are those sentences to be handled in the same way as sentences

in which the referent of the subject is a finite substance?

are two strong reasons for believing the answer to be yes.

There
In the

first place, Leibniz never makes an exception to his definition of
truth, and it is hard to believe that he would make God one.

In the

second place, Leibniz says that corresponding to every substance there
is a complete individual concept and there is no reason to believe

that Leibniz thought God was an exception, even though God is an infinite

substance.

If God has a concept,

-

then there seems to be no reason not

10

to claim that sentences about God are true
just in case the concept

of the predicate is included in the concept
of God.

However, if we

say this then it seems, as opposed to what Leibniz
says, that
is

(2)

true.
If we consider the sentence,

"God is morally perfect," as true,

then the concept of moral perfection is included in the
concept of
God.

But if the concept of moral perfection is included in the
concept

of God,

then does it not follow that it is metaphysically necessary

that God is morally perfect?

To determine whether or not this follows,

we must briefly consider what Leibniz says about metaphysical necessity.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz explicitly says that something is

metaphysically necessary just in case its negation implies a contradiction.

However, there are certain problems if we understand Leibniz

as saying this simpliciter

.

The suggestion being presented is that

P is necessary if and only if not-P entails a contradiction.

But on

this view we can show that it is necessary that Adam has blond hair,

clearly an unwanted result.

The proof of this is something like the

following:
(1)

For any x, and for any set

x
(2)

e

if x e S,

S,

then necessarily

S

If the concept of blond hair

e

the concept of Adam, then

necessarily the concept of blond hair

e

the concept of

e

the concept of

Adam.
(3)

Necessarily the concept of blond hair
Adam.

Assume:

(A)

It is not

the case that Adam has blond hair.

11

(5)

It is not the case that the concept of
blond hair
e

/..

the concept of Adam.

(6)

The concept of blond hair

(7)

Q and not-Q.

(3)

It is not the case that Adam has blond hair implj
.les

the concept of Adam.

e

Q and not-Q.
(9)

It is not the case that Adam has blond hair entails
Q and not-Q.

/..
(1)

(10)

Necessarily Adam has blond hair.

is a truth about sets,

and (2) is just an instantiation of (1).

Assuming that Adam does have blond hair and given Leibniz's definition
of truth, from (2) we can get

(3).

We then assume Adam does not have

blond hair, and using Leibniz's definition we arrive at a contradiction.
Given that (3) is a necessary statement, and

(8)

followed from only

our assumption and necessary truths, we can conclude (9).

definition of necessity suggested and

(9)

From

the

we finally conclude (10).

It is obvious that something has gone wrong here.

Leibniz clearly

wants Adam to have blond hair contingently.
The answer to this problem lies in the narrow view suggested

above of Leibniz's notion of metaphysical necessity.

While it is

true that in some sense Adam can not lack the property of having

blond hair, namely in the sense described above, it should not follow
that it is metaphysically necessary that Adam has blond hair.

Leibniz's

notion of metaphysical necessity involves in part Leibniz's use of
possible worlds.

We want to say that a proposition is metaphysically

necessary just in case it is true in all worlds,, not just the world

12

that exists.

Setting up such an account for Leibniz is
something which

will be discussed at great length later, as well as
opposing points
of view on this quention.

A complete account of Leibniz's notion of

metaphysical necessity is not necessary to discuss the
problems about
God in Leibniz's metaphysical system.

For different accounts presented

and discussed in detail, see Chapters II, III, and IV.

In Chapter IV

it is suggested that for Leibniz to say a sentence of the form
’x is
F'

is necessary is to say that all the "counterparts" of the concept

of x include the concept of F.

A "counterpart" of a concept is a con-

cept which contains certain properties which the original concept

contains.

Intuitively, if the two concepts were realized, then the

two substances would be very similar to each other.

For example, to

say of a sentence about Adam that it is metaphysically necessary is
to say that all the counterparts of the concept of Adam in various

worlds include the concept of the predicate.
all finite substances.

This will hold true for

But a difficulty emerges when we try to account

for God in this conceptual framework.
It makes some sense to talk about the counterparts of the concept

of Adam being in various worlds, as we can talk about the concept of

Adam being a member of this world.

But in God's case it is not so

clear that his concept is a member of any world.

Talk about counter-

part concepts of the concept of God seems, on the face of it, bizarre.

There are, as far as we can tell, three plausible ways of considering
God in the conceptual framework just set up, but all have difficulties.
We could say that the concept of God is not a member of any world,
but somehow exists apart from all worlds (call this view A).

We can

13

still say that an atomic sentence about
God is true just in case the

concept of the subject includes the concept
of the predicate.

However,

we can no longer say, as we did in the case
of Adam, that a sentence
about God is necessarily true just in case all
the counterparts of the

concept of God in various possible worlds include
the concept of the
predicate, since it makes no sense to talk about the
counterparts of
the concept of God, nor does it make sense to talk
about God's concept

being a member of a possible world.

We might say that God is an

exception and the truth conditions for necessary sentences about
God
are somehow different from those about (say) Adam.

which sentences are to count as being about God.

But it is not clear

Clearly all atomic

sentences in which the concept of the subject is the concept of God

will be counted as being about God, but what about such sentences as,
"There is an all-knowing being," or, "There exists a necessary being"?
Even if we could somehow find a way to distinguish sentences about God
from sentences not about God, we would still need to decide what the
truth conditions for necessary sentences would be.

And without the

use of possible worlds it is far from clear what they would be.

A second view,

(B)

,

and an alternative approach to the suggestion

that God's concept is not a member of any world, would be the view
that God's concept is a member of every world.

Atomic and necessary

sentences about God would be treated the same as sentences about Adam.
We would thus have a uniform account of truth for all sentences in
the language.

Consider, for example, the sentence, "God is all-powerful".

This sentence will be necessary just in case all the counterparts of
the concept of God in various worlds have the property of being all-

14

powerful.

In God's case the counterparts of the concept
of God will

simply be the concept of God.

But this also has its difficulties.

If you will recall, a possible world is a maximal
compossible set

of concepts.

Moreover, each concept mirrors the world of which
it

is a member.

As argued earlier 21 no concept can be a member of
two
,

worlds, yet on this view we are supposing that God's concept is
a

member of every world.

This is clearly an inconsistency.

The only way we can see to avoid this inconsistency, given the

view described above, is to claim that in some way God is an exception.
We might wish to claim that there is a basis for making God an exception,

namely God is an infinite substance, whereas we mere mortals are only
finite substances.

The idea would be that the compossibility and

mirroring relations are only applicable to finite substance concepts
(i.e., concepts such that if actualized,

the corresponding substance

would be finite) and not to infinite substance concepts (of
there is only one)

.

which

If we accept this f inite-inf inite substance concept

distinction, then the view does not appear to be inconsistent.

However,

while not inconsistent, it has some obvious bad results for Leibniz.
For example, it turns out that all of God's properties are possessed

by him of necessity.

Consider any property P that God possesses.

God has P, P is a member of the concept of God.
is a member of every world,

Since

The concept of God

thus God has P of necessity.

In particular,

it is metaphysically necessary that God is morally perfect.

But this

result is exactly the result which started our discussion of Leibniz's

view of metaphysical necessity, and which we had hoped to avoid.
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A third approach

,

(C)

,

to

the problem would be to say that God

does in fact have dis tinct counterpart concepts
in various possible
worlds, as does Adam. 22

On this view we suppose that God has certain

essential properties (e.g., being all-knowing), but
also God has

contingent properties which are in some of his counterparts,
but
not all.

We could then say that being morally perfect is a
contingent

property of God

s.

exists necessarily.

We can also hold the Leibnizian view that God

This would be true because the concept of God

would have a counterpart in every world.

This view avoids a number

of problems that the second view must account for.

For example, in

the second view we had to make God an exception to the principle that
a concept is in only one world.

But with the view now being suggested,

God is not an exception, because the concept of God is only a member
of one world, namely this one.

The relations of compossibility and

mirroring will apply to the concept of God and
of the concept of God.

to the counterparts

This view has the major advantage of being

uniform in that God is treated on a par with Adam, or with any other
substance.

However, this view is not without its problems.

One major difficulty with view C is that it is non-Leibnizian.

Leibniz says that possible worlds are found in God's understanding,

which is the region of possibles, and that from among them God chose
one to create.

On this view there seems to be no way of explaining

how God, whose concept is a member of only one world, viewed all the

possible worlds and picked one to create.

The picture of creation

that Leibniz presents is that of God standing apart from the possible

worlds and viewing them to see which is the best to create.

View A
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seems closest to the text in this respect, view
it, and B somewhere between A and C.

C

seems farthest from

The idea that the concept of

God has distinct counterparts in every possible
world is totally alien
to Lerbniz,
C is an

and it seems clear he would reject it.

Thus, while view

interesting one and it solves a number of difficulties, it
is

too un-Leibnizian to be acceptable.

The most promising of the three views presented seems to be
view
B,

but if we opt for view B then, at the very least, we are left to

deal with the conclusion of argument

I,

namely, it is metaphysically

necessary that God create the best of all possible worlds, much
Leibniz's chagrin.
think.

to

However, this result is not as bad as one might

Before we pursue this, let us return to the original argument

for a closer look.
It does seem curious that Leibniz affirms premise (1) in the argu-

ment as opposed to affirming something like:
(4)

It is morally necessary that if God decides to create

some world, then God will create the best of all possible

worlds
If we understand moral necessity as suggested,

then (4) translates into

the followiug in terms of metaphysical necessity:
(5)

It is metaphysically necessary that if God decides to

create some world, then God will create the best of all

possible worlds.
In order to logically conclude (3), we would need an additional premise,

namely
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(7)

It is morally necessary that God decide
to create some

possible world. ^3
The reason that Leibniz so willingly affirms
premise (1) as opposed
to something like

be true.

(4)

is

that he holds (7), or something like it, to

Leibniz says:
it may be said that God can cause virtue to be
in the world without any mixture of vice, and even
that he can do so easily
But, since he has permitted
vice, it must be that that order of the universe which
.

.

.

.

was found preferable to every other plan required it.
One must believe that it is not permitted to do otherwise, since it is not possible to do better.
(T p. 197)

Leibniz seems to believe that if God did not create any world at all
r\ /

then God would not be doing what was best.

The best possible series

of events that could occur would be for God to do exactly as he did.

Thus (7) is true.

It therefore makes no difference whether Leibniz

affirms (1) or (4), since in either case we can conclude (3).
is

(3)

But

really that bad for Leibniz?

One might want to distinguish between (3) and something like:
(8)

It is metaphysically necessary that God create the

actual world;
and
(9)

It is metaphysically necessary that God create this

world
One might want to claim (9) is a bad result, but (3) is not since this

world is not necessarily the best of all possible worlds.
Leibniz (3),

(8)

and (9) all say the same thing.

But for

It is necessary

that this world is the best of all possible worlds, hence (3) and (9)

say the same thing.

The phrase "the actual world" is just another
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name for this world, thus (8) and (9), and hence

Leibniz would reject (3),
for his rejection of (2).

(8)

(3)

say the same thing.

and (9) for reasons similar to those given

But if we adopt the second view of meta-

physical necessity suggested, then it seems Leibniz is stuck with
(9).
God did create this world, thus included in his concept is the
property
of creating this world.

God create this world.

Hence, it is metaphysically necessary that

As noted before, any property that God has, he

has of necessity.
It appears that for Leibniz we have reached the end of the rope.
It is metaphysically necessary that God create this world,

had no choice but to create this world.

thus God

This conclusion is bad in

itself for Leibniz, but what seems worse is that everything which

follows from God's creation is also necessary.

What this seems to

mean is that all true sentences about this world are necessarily true,
and hence Leibniz cannot allow for contingency as his objectors have

maintained.

But while it is true that God does nothing but of neces-

sity, it is not so clear that we mortals are under the same constraint.
It is not at all clear that it follows from God's creating this

world of necessity that (say) it is necessary that Adam has blond
hair.

(Necessity will be used in the metaphysical sense henceforth.)

On the view suggested above,

to say that it is

necessary that Adam

has blond hair is to say that all of the counterparts of the concept
of Adam in various possible worlds include the concept of blond hair.

Surely this will still be false, and hence it is contingent that

Adam has blond hair.
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One might think that since God created this
world of necessity,
this world is the only possible world, other
"worlds" being impossible.
If this world is the only possible world,

then the concept of Adam

has a single counterpart in the various possible
worlds, namely itself.
Thus, it is true that all of the counterparts of the
concept of Adam

include the concept of blond hair (since there is only one
counterpart),
and hence it is necessary that Adam has blond hair.

presupposes

a

This argument

certain view about what possible worlds are.

It assumes

that a world is a possible world just in case the world could have

been actualized.

And this is indeed the way we have been considering

possible worlds.

But this is not the only way to view possible worlds.

Leibniz says, "although God assuredly chooses the best, this does not
prevent that which is less perfect from being possible in itself,"
(OC p.

22).

The notion that is important here is that of something

"being possible in itself".

We can view possible worlds not as worlds

which God might create, but rather as worlds which are not contradictory.

In order to see how this might work we will have to revise

our definition of compossibility

Let P be the set of all properties P

.

.

all complete individual concepts C

.

1

,.C

.

.P

n

1

and C the set of

,

Let us further suppose

n

we have a first-order language such as the lower predicate calculus.
In our language we have a number of predicates F ...F
1

In

set of all predicates) and constants a,...

constants).
so

Let

.

i

for some i.

)=C
i

(let A be the set of all

for some i, and for each a

in F, f(F )=P

that for each F
i

f (a

(let F be the

n

be a function from F onto P, and from A onto C,

f

l

i
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in A
1

Let H be the set of all the sentences of our
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language of the form
of A.

Ox

where

0

is a member of F and x is a member

We can now define a function
g from C into the power set of

the Cartesian product of F and A.

For each C. in C, g(C
1

)

i

is the set

of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x is a member
of F and y is a member

of A and f(y)=C

i

and f(x)=P

a function h from g(C
1

of the form

pair (F

±

,

Ox

a

)

)

i

for each P

into H.

h(g(C

))

i>

We can now define

is a set

S

of sentences

i

and F^a is a member of

is a member of

concepts C^,

in C

±

gCCj.

S

if and only if the ordered

A set of complete individual

is compossible if and only if hCgCC^)) union

h (g (C^) )••• union

MgCC^))...

is consistent.

A set of sentences is

consistent if and only if it is not the case they mutually entail
every sentence.
concepts.

A possible world is a maximal compossible set of

Possible worlds are possible in the sense that they are

somehow internally compatible, and not according to whether God could
or could not have created them.

While it may be impossible that God

create any world other than this world, that does not make the worlds
themselves impossible.

However, it appears that even if we make the

distinction between two views of possibility we are still left with
the original objection.

On view B God has all of his properties of necessity.

In parti-

cular, God has the property of being self-identical and Adam existing
of necessity.

But if God has that property, then it would seem to

follow that Adam exists of necessity.

Since this seems true of every

substance for all the properties it has, there appears to be no contingency.

But a closer examination of this argument will reveal that

on the view being suggested it is unsound.

Let ’a' represent 'Adam',
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g

represent ’God', and

represent ’it is necessary that’,

We

can symbolize the property in question
with the use of abstracts 26
The argument can be represented as
follows:
II*

/

•

(1)

St

(2)

[it

(3)

•

p

[

x-x

„

(Ey) (a=y)]

g

[

x=x

-

(Ey) (a=y)

g

J

+ (Ey)(a=y)]

(Ey) (a=y)

The argument is clearly valid, and sound
on some interpretations of
and

.

But on the view being suggested premise
(2) is false.

The key to understanding premise
(2)

(a=y)]

names a property just as

is realizing that ’£[x=x

names a property.

’F'

A

(Ey)

A modal operator

in front of an abstract does not alter the name
of the property.

Thus

the following sentence can be true:

(4)0

[St

[x=x

A

(Ey)(a=y)]

g

A

v(Ey) (a=y))

Consider a world W where the concept of Adam lacks a counterpart.

In

that world it will be true that the concept of God contains the property
of being self-identical and Adam existing, and it will be true that

the concept of Adam lacks a counterpart.
of (4).

If

(4)

is

true,

This is the interpretation

then it is clear that (2) must be false.

The

point can be put in a different way.

While it is true that £ [x=x
(Ey)(a~y),

A

(Ey)(a=y)]g is equivalent to g=g

they are not necessarily equivalent.

A

The reason they are

not necessarily equivalent is in the nature of modal operators on this

view.

When a modal operator preceeds a sentence which contains a

constant not included in the name of a predicate, then the sentence
is understood as saying something about the counterparts of the concept

associated with the constant.

However, when the constant occurs in
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the name of a predicate in a
sentence, then adding modal
operators to
the sentence does not affect the
name of the predicate. Thus,
*[ x=x
(Ey) (a=y)J g says something different
from
it seems strange,

(g=g

(Ey)(a= y )).

A

,

Admittedly,

even contradictory, to say that in
some world God

has the property of being self-identical
and Adam existing, yet Adam

does not exist in that world.

One might ask himself, how can it be

that God have that property and Adam not
exist?

The answer is that

God could not have that property unless Adam
existed, but it is not

necessary that Adam exist in every world in order
that God have the
property in every world.

In effect,

the property that God has in every

world is that of being self-identical and Adam existing
in some world.
In view of these considerations it seems that for all
the problems

that view B has, it can allow for contingency.

The fact that God created this world of necessity does create

some minor problems for the view being suggested.

Intuitively, counter-

parts of concepts are those concepts God might have realized in place
of the concepts he did realize.

But if God created this world

of

necessity, then we can not literally view counterparts this way since
God could not have realized any concepts other than the ones he in

fact realized.

But

I

do not believe this to be a major difficulty.

The problem of what counterparts are is discussed in detail in Chapter
To summarize the position being suggested, an atomic sentence Fa
is

true if and only if the concept of F is included in the concept of

a_.

An atomic sentence Fa is necessary just in case all the counter-

parts of the concept of

a.

include the concept of

F.

The concept of

God is different than any other concept and it is not subject to the

V.
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same restrictions that other
concepts have.

This is in part because

the concept of God is the concept
of an infinite substance.

The con-

cept of God is a member of every world
and hence has every property

necessarily, including the property of
creating this world.

But even

though God necessarily created this world,
it does not follow that
all true propositions are necessary.

Adam has blond hair contingently

because some of the counterparts of the concept
of Adam do not include
the property of having blond hair.

Leibniz believed that he could avoid the consequence
that God

necessarily created this world, and his writings reflect
his belief.
In order to facilitate discussions in the remainder
of this dissertation
it will be assumed for the most part that God was
free in his creation.

Since God’s necessarily creating this world does not affect
the con-

tingency of other sentences,

difficulties.

the assumption will not cause any major

If this becomes important,

As pointed out in the introduction,

it will certainly be noted.

there are two kinds of objections

raised against Leibniz to the effect that he cannot allow for contingency.
One deals with the problem of God and has been accounted for in this

chapter.

The other is what we will call the "analytic-necessary" problem.

In the next chapter,

two solutions offered for this problem by two dif-

ferent philosophers will be discussed.

It will be assumed in that

chapter that God is free in his creation of this world.
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(i)
$ is an n-place predicate followed by n terms, or
(ii)
If $ is a wff then M> is a wff, and
(iii)
If $ and ^ are wffs then $ v
is a wff, and
(iv)
If $ and
are wffs then
is a wff
A
(v)
If $ and
are wffs then $ E
is a wff
(vi)
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$
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$ is an n-place predicate letter, or
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If $ is a wff containing n free variables x
...
^
then
... & [$
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is an n-place predicate
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]
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a
a
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read"a replaces all occurrences of 6 in $").

Example sentence: "Adam is married to Eve" will be translated as
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[xMe]a, where 'xMy' is 'x is married to y' and *e'
the following:
k[xMe]a is understood as expressing
is 'Eve', and 'a' is 'Adam'.
Adam
has
the property of being married to Eve.
that
proposition
the
26.

See note 25 above.

CHAPTER

N

II

Some philosophers argue that Leibniz cannot allow for
contingency

not because of God's lack of freedom, but because of Leibniz's
defini-

tion of truth.

John W. Nason

presents a now-familiar criticism of

Leibniz based on Leibniz's view of truth.

Nason says of Leibniz:

... he asserts that all true affirmative propositions
are analytic, i.e., they are true because the subject
includes the predicate.
This is as true, he asserts,
of contingent propositions as it is of necessary truths.
But if it were true that all true affirmative propositions are analytic, then all such propositions are
necessary and there is no contingency.
If some propositions are genuinely contingent, they can not be
analytic.
In this chapter, the views of two contemporary philosophers, G.H.R.
.

.

Parkinson and

N.

Rescher, will be considered.

Both suggest a way of

understanding Leibniz in which Leibniz can avoid the objection Nason
and others have raised against him.

We will call this objection the

"analytic-necessary" problem since the criticism is, in effect, that
since Leibniz holds that all true propositions are analytic, it follows
that all true propositions are necessary.

Parkinson and Rescher offer

different solutions to the problem, and it shall be argued here that
each solution is in some way inadequate.
G.H.R. Parkinson presents what he believes is Leibniz's solution
to the analytic-necessary problem in his book Logic and Reality in

Leibniz

s

Metaphysics

.

Parkinson says:

By making use of the notion of an infinite analysis
of certain concepts, Leibniz has succeeded in reconciling his view that every truth is either an expressly
or implicitly identical proposition with his view that
(Pi
P» 73)
not all truths are necessary.
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He reconciles the two views by saying
that to speak
of necessary and contingent truths
is to speak of
our ability or inability to prove
that a true proposition is identical.
Briefly, every truth is an
identical proposition, or reducible to one;
a truth
is necessary if it is either an identical
proposition,
or human beings can demonstrate that it
is an identical
proposition; it is contingent if they cannot but
know
its truth by other non-deductive means.
(PI
pp. 71-72)

All truths, in his (Leibniz's) view, are either
identical
propositions or reducible to them; but those which are
either identical propositions or reducible to such propositions in a finite number of operations we call ’necessary
and those which require an inf initenumber of
operations for their reduction we call 'contingent'.
,

(PI

p.

73)

In order to understand the view that Parkinson is trying to
present, one

should first try to understand some of the expressions Parkinson
uses
in presenting the view.

Parkinson holds that Leibniz gives two accounts of truth, one in
terms of inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the concept of
the subject, and the other in terms of what he calls 'identical propo-

sitions'.

On the first account, to say a proposition is true is to

say that the concept of the subject includes or contains the concept
of the predicate.

The second account is that a proposition is true

just in case either it is an identical proposition or it is reducible
to an identical proposition.

Parkinson points out that for Leibniz

an identical proposition is not just a proposition expressed by an

identity sentence.
(Leibniz) makes it clear, however, that when he
speaks of an identical proposition in the present
context he has in mind, not only propositions such
but also propositions such
as 'A man is a man'
In effect, he is using
as 'A white man is white'
tautologous
the term' identical as a synonym for
as he himself implies when he remarks that he ca.11s
He

,

.

'

'

'
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certain truths 'identical' because 'it seems
that
they do nothing but repeat the same thing,
without
teaching us anything'
In saying, then, that a
true proposition is either an identical
proposition
or reducible to one, Leibniz means that a
true
proposition either is or is reducible to a tautology.
.

(PI

p.

65)

Parkinson writes inaccurately when he applies the word
'tautology' to
a sentence like,

"A white man is white".

This sentence is not a taut-

ology? as the word is generally used, however it is a
logical truth.
We should understand Parkinson here to mean by tautology what
is

ordinarily meant by logical truth.

Thus an identical proposition

is a proposition expressed by a logical truth.

Parkinson says that Leibniz relates these two accounts of truth,
"by saying that in an identical proposition the predicate is in the

subject manifestly or expressly, whilst in all other true propositions
it is present in the subject in a concealed form

or virtually," (PI

p.

57).

(

tecte )

,

or implicitly

Parkinson is claiming, in effect, that

the two accounts of truth Leibniz presents are the same.

To say that

a proposition is true if it is an identical proposition is the same as

saying that a proposition is true if the concept of the predicate is

included in the concept of the subject expressly.

Similarly, to say

that a non-identical proposition can be reduced to an identical propo-

sition is the same as saying the concept of the predicate is included
in the concept of the subject, but only implicitly cr virtually.

Given

that these two accounts of truth are the same, we are still left to

puzzle over how a non-identical proposition is reduced to an identical
proposition.
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Parkinson tries to explain away our
puzzlement by means of an
example.

He asks us to consider the non- identical
proposition expressed

by the sentence, "Every man is rational".

Since the sentence is non-

identical, the inclusion of the concept of the
predicate in the concept
of the subject is only implicit.

Parkinson continues and says, "This

inclusion can, as he (Leibniz) remarks, be made explicit
by analysis
of the concepts or terms of the proposition; in this
case, by replacing

the term 'man' by the term 'rational animal', giving the
proposition.

Every rational animal is rational,' which Leibniz would call
an

identical proposition," (PI

p.

58).

There is a minor difficulty here.

This example can create more problems than it should if one believes
that the proposition expressed by, "Every man is rational," is identical
to

the proposition expressed by, "Every rational animal is rational".

In order to avoid problems which are not really relevant to the problem

at hand, we assume the sentences express different propositions.

But

even if we ignore the problem of propositional identity, it seems we

have removed the problem only one step further.

In order to explain

how a non-identical proposition can be reduced to an identical proposition, Parkinson introduces the notion of an "analysis of the concepts
or terms of the proposition".

It is not that the notion is non-Leibnizian,

for Leibniz often talks about performing an analysis of a concept, but
it seems just as opaque as the idea of a reduction.

Parkinson, however,

attempts to clarify it.
He says, "a proposition is 'reduced' by means of the analysis of

concepts, i.e. by substitutions made on the basis of definitions.

This

analysis of concepts, it may be remembered, is analogous to spelling
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out the letters of a word," (PI

p

.

74).

Parkinson does not see™ to be much help.

But this explanation by

Consider the example Parkinson

gives, where we start with the
proposition that every man is rational
and by an analysis of eoncepts end
with the proposition that every

rational animal is rational.

According to Parkinson the analysis in

this case is the replacement of the term
'man' by the term 'rational

animal'.

It is clear that one can not replace
the term 'man'

in the

proposition that every man is rational, since the
term does not occur

m

the Proposition.

the term ’man’

What Parkinson might mean is that if we replace

in the sentence "Every man is rational" by the
term

rational animal’, the resulting sentence is, "Every rational
animal
is rational".

But while this makes some sense, it hardly seems like

performing an analysis on a concept.

However, it does indicate how we

might reduce one proposition to another proposition.

We can say that

the proposition that every man is rational can be reduced to the propos -

ition that every rational animal is rational, if the sentence "Every man
is rational", which expresses the proposition that every man is rational,

is such that when we replace the term ’man’ by the term 'rational animal'

the resulting sentence expresses the proposition that every rational

animal is rational and the concept associated with the term 'man' is
identical to the concept associated with the term 'rational animal'.
But the problem suggested above be ignored because it seemed irrelevant

seems very relevant now.

If the concept of man is identical to the

concept of rational animal, then it would seem that the proposition
that every man is rational is identical with the proposition that every

rational animal is rational.

And if we are only discussing one proposition,
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what sense can be made of the claim that a
reduction has occurred?
One way to avoid this problem is to
understand the reduction as

occurring in the language with which we express
the propositions.
is,

That

we understand the notion of a reduction of
propositions which allows

that if we reduce a proposition to a proposition,
the propositions need

not be distinct.

For example, suppose that the proposition that
every

man is rational is identical to the proposition that every
rational
animal is rational.
by the sentence

We can still say that the proposition expressed

Every man is rational" is reduced to the proposition

expressed by the sentence "Every rational animal is rational", because
the sentence "Every rational animal is rational" can be obtained from
the sentence "Every man is rational" by replacement of terms whose

concepts are identical.

Thus, what we define is a notion of reduci-

bility relative to propositions and sentences.

When we talk about

propositions being reduced, we mean propositions expressed by certain
sentences
One might object that on this view the relation of reducibility
is symmetrical.

But for our pusposes, it does not matter if the rela-

tion is symmetrical.

It is unimportant that it follows that if one can

reduce a non-logical truth to a logical truth, then one can reduce a
logical truth to a non-logical truth.
the first step,

logical truths.

We are primarily interested in

that is, how one can reduce non-logical truths to

This view seems to explain this.

this view in a definition.

First, some notation:

We can generalize
if $ is a sentence,

then let P($) be the proposition $ expresses, if any.
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(DFR)

P($) can be reduced to P(*) iff
$ contains a term a,
and
ip

m

is exactly like
ip

3>

except that for each occurrence
of a

contains a term

3,

and the concept of a is identical

to the concept of 3.

The idea of an analysis is relevant
in the sense that in some way
one has to analyze the concept of
a and the concept of

determine whether they are identical or not.
of a by, as it were,

concept.

3

in order to

One analyzes the concept

spelling out the properties contained in the

Parkinson suggests it is, "analogous to spelling
our the

letters of a word".

Perhaps (DFR) is not much help in understanding

what an analysis of a concept is, but it does give us
an idea of what
a reduction is, which is what we wanted in the
first, place.

Thus we

can say with some clarity that a proposition is true just
in case it
is an identical proposition or it is reducible to one.

We now turn

to the problem of necessary propositions.

Parkinson seems to present two different accounts of necessity
for Leibniz.

According to one, a proposition is necessary just in

case either it is an identical proposition or human beings can demon-

strate that it is an identical proposition.

On the other, a propos-

ition is necessary if and only if either it is an identical proposition
or is reducible to an identical proposition in a finite number of oper-

ations.

However, even though these two accounts appear to be different,

they are essentially the same.
to understand the word

’can'

in a strict logical sense.

In the first account Parkinson wants

in the phrase ’human being can demonstrate’

Thus, according to Parkinson, any propos-

ition that is reducible to an identical proposition in a finite number
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of operations is one such that humans
'can'

an identical proposition.

equivalent.

demonstrate that it is

Therefore, the two accounts are really

A necessary proposition is either an
identical propo-

sition or one reducible to an identical
proposition in a finite number
of operations.

A contingent proposition is one that is not an
iden-

tical proposition and its reduction to an identical
proposition would

require an infinite number of operations.

But unfortunately it appears

that under (DFR) all reductions are finite; all require a
single

operation.

If

this is the case,

then all true propositions are necessary

There are at least two possible ways of attempting to meet this
difficulty.

One way is to change the definition of reduction to allow in

some way the notion of an infinite number of operations.

The other

way is to attempt a more precise definition of a concept and see if
the idea of an infinite number of operations arises there.

way appears

to

involve us in a number of obscurities, thus we will try

the former method first.

First, some notation to make the definitions

more readable.

If

of a in $ by 3,

then S(^)={3).

(DFR1)

is obtained from $ by replacing all occurrences

\p

P($) can be reduced to P (ip ) in a finite number of operations
if there is a series of sentences $
0

$q=$ and

from

and for each

i,

1

<_

by replacing a term a in

i

such that

...

,

<_

is obtained

n,

by a term

3

not a member

S($.), and the concept of a is identical to the

of

JO.

concept of
(DFR2)

The latter

3

3*

P($) can be reduced to P(^) in an infinite number of operations
if there is a series of sentences $

...

$

n

...

such that
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0

,

and for any i, 1 < 1, *.

replacing a term a in

is obtained from *

+i

by a term

*

by

not a member of
(J s(4>
J£i
j
and the concept of a is identical
to the concept of
and
3,
6

) *

^

the limit of the series $

is

...
0

To say that

ip

is

$

n

the limit of the series is to say that
for each $
i

which is a member of the series,

is

4>

member of the series is identical to
the limit of the series 1/2,

limit of the series

ip

1/2 + 1/4,

...

...

closer to * than *

is, and no

The idea is that just as
1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8,

The analogy between

..., $ is

and

1

is

1

the

is a

ip

good one in the sense that Leibniz himself often gives
similar kinds
of examples in attempting to explain the notion of an
infinite analysis.

But it is not clear just how analogous the two cases are.

sense to talk about

being the limit of the series 1/2, 1/2 + 1/4, ...,

1

the notion in this case is well defined.

series

...

It makes

But in the case of the

it is not clear that there is a limit.

tigate this problem, several definitions are needed.

To inves-

O

Let {S
n

sequence with n members.

Let {S

}

n

example if n equals
S

4

be a sequence with n members.

then {S^} stands for the sequence

5

stands for the kind of objects in the sequence.
*

T

S
x

<3^

S

2

For
,

may be '1/2’, and

'S

'

2

may be *1/2 + 1/4', and so on.

mean 'is greater than or equal
S
1

>_

*.

S
2

An

to that of m.

a)

to'

3

,

'S’

In the example given

Let '>'

represent the ordering relation of the sequence in question.

,

S

where the subscripts stand for the identity of members and

>

S

’

5,

be a

}

and in our example we could say

sequence is a sequence whose cardinality is equal

might
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DF1.

(

S^) is an increasing w sequence if and only
if

An increasing w sequence {S^}is
bounded above
(ES) [(n)

S

n

<

(

n ) (S

> S

)

if and only if

S]

We define the notion of a limit
for a bounded increasing w sequence:
DF3:

Let {$

('V
an

a)

n

lim {S

n

>n

e

a,

= df

(

lX )(n) [S^

<

x

.

represent the appropriate sequence.

>

haS 3 llmit

-

(y)(S

y ^ x < y)]

<

It is not clear that

In the first place, it is not clear
that {$

n

}

is

sequence.

Before we can even start we must assume
that the language has at
least an infinite number of terms.

But even if we assume that the set

of terms is infinite, we are still not
guaranteed that the sequence
is infinite.

suppose

$
U

We need a further condition.

To avoid needless complexity,

only contains one term which can be replaced.

Let R($

)

0

represent the replacement set for

(i.e.,

$

the set of all those terms

0

which can replace the term in

$

)

.

0

In order to guarantee that {$

}

infinite, the following condition must hold:

(E)

:

(n) [r($

n

s($

)

r <n

effect, guarantees for us (if it holds) that the

replacement set for

1

.

(for any n) has not already been exhausted or

used up by the time we reach

$

n

will be infinite.

)]
J

r

This condition, in

n

is

n

in the series.

If

holds, then{$

(E)

}

n

But a sequence's being infinite is not sufficient

for it to have a limit.

For one thing,

Is it true that all the members of {$

}

n

the sequence must be bounded.

are less than

p?

\

In this con-

text it does not, of course, make any sense to talk about one sentence

being less than another sentence.

The proposition expressed by

ip

is

supposed to be an identical proposition, while the members of the sequence
do not express logical truths.

As

we.

progress along the sequence they
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become closer and closer to

In order to find out whether

i|>.

really

is the limit, we need some
definition of the closeness relation.

Consider the sequence

DM:

i.

a

$

01
,

$

...

$

...

$

i

is closer to * than $.

sequence such that

, 1

,

j

if and only if:

is before $

and

There exlsts

(i)

is the limit;

and (ii)
if *

For all sequences {$"} such that $ =
n
i
is not in {$'}, then the limit is
not ijj.

This definition in effect says that if

$

is closer to

.

J

then the only way to approach
a

\p

from

then
o’

than

is,

$
i

is

through

DF4 gives us

precise definition of the relation of closeness, but
it also leads

one to a question which seems to be the crux of the
whole problem.

That is, are the rules given for replacement such that
it is true that
if a sentence occurs later in the sequence then
it is closer to the

sentence which we want to say is the limit?

If the answer is no,

then

DF4 will never hold and the sequences described can not be said to

have limit.

The problem is that in the sequence 1/2, 1/2 + 1/4, ... we

have a clear sense of what it means to say each succeeding member is
closer to the limit, but in the sequence {$

whether

or $

}

it makes no difference

occurs later in the sequence (this is assuming the

answer to the question posed above is no).
if

n

occurs before

$

.

or vice versa,

one is closer than the other.

there can be no sense in saying

It would,

say the sequence approaches a limit.

If it makes no difference

thus, make little sense to

If the answer to the question

posed is yes, then we have a clear idea of what it means to say a non-

identical proposition is reduced to an identical proposition (provided
the conditions stated earlier are satisfied).

4
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Unfortunately, while the idea expressed
in (DFR2) is an interesting
one,

it will not be of much help
for us,

since it is unclear that DF4

will ever be satisfied under the
rules given for replacement.
and $

-

i+1

^

i+1

is obtained by replacing some
term in $

Consider
and the

condition of the replacement is that the
concepts of the two terms be
identical.

Provided that

is not

it could have been obtained from
$.

the first member of the sequence,

+r

There is nothing in the rules

which would lead one to believe that it is
possible to arrive at

$

i+1

from

and not 9
±

from $.
+i>

We might try changing the rules of

replacement to avoid this problem, but it is not clear
that we could
change the rules and yet retain an adequate idea of a
reduction.

Thus,

we must conclude that while this is an interesting approach
to the

problem it does not seem to solve it.
Earlier two alternative approaches to the problem that under (DFR)

reductions are finite were discussed.

nition of a reduction, and the other was
an analysis of a concept is.

One was to change the defito attempt

to clarify what

We have already discussed the first ap-

proach and it has been suggested that this will not be of much help.
Perhaps if we understand what an analysis of a concept is, we can see
how, under Parkinson's suggestion, some sentences turn out to be con-

tingent.

Parkinson asks us to consider the contingent sentence, "The

sun is now shining", and says, "only if the concept of the subject of
the true proposition 'The sun is now shining' is analyzed into a concept
of infinite complexity, describing everything in the universe, can it

be seen how the concept of the subject includes that of the predicate,"
(PI

p.

73).

Parkinson clarifies the problem somewhat when he indicates
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that an analysis is an, "analysis of a concept
into its component con-

cepts," (PI

p.

75).

If we understand Parkinson correctly,
he is sug-

gesting that in contingent sentences the analysis of
the concept of
the subject is such that its 'component concepts'
are infinitely complex.

One difficulty here is in understanding what Parkinson
means by "com-

ponent concepts

.

Presumably, one of the 'component concepts' of the

concept of man is the concept of animal.

ponent concept

Thus, we can say that a 'com-

of a concept C is a concept which is either a member

of C or a subset of C.

For example, one component concept of the con-

cept of square is the concept of rectangle, since the concept of rec-

tangle is a subset of the concept of square.

One of the component

concepts of the concept of the sun is the concept of now shining (where
'now'

is a demonstrative referring to a particular time).

Parkinson

claims that the concept of the sun is a concept of infinite complexity.
Even if this is true it is difficult to see why we would have to com-

pletely analyze the concept of the sun in order to determine that the
concept of now shining is included in it.

It would seem more reasonable

to believe that since the concept of now shining is included in the

concept of the sun we would not have to analyze the concept into a

concept of infinite complexity.

We would only have to analyze the

concept enough to see that the concept of now shining is included in
it, which surely is not infinitely complex.

Parkinson says, "to explain

the possibility of contingent truths Leibniz need only say, without

being more specific, that there are certain true propositions whose
analysis is infinite," (PI

p.

73).

But surely the whole problem here

is in trying to understand what it means to say an analysis is infinite.
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One person could claim that in order to
see that the concept of the

predicate is included in the concept of
the subject in the sentence,
The sun is now shining," an infinite
analysis would be required, while

another person could deny this.
correct.

Neither claim could be shown to be

The notion of what an analysis of a concept
is is just too

obscure to be any help.
We must conclude that Parkinson’s attempt to
provide for Leibniz
an answer to the analytic-necessary problem
fails.

While the account

he presents is Leibnizian in certain respects, it
does not clearly

answer the objection.

Until we can get a clear idea of what an analysis

of a concept is, or until we can make sense of the
notion of an infinite

number of operations in

a

reduction from one proposition to another,

we are simply unable to determine whether Parkinson’s account of Leibniz

really solves the difficulty.

Rescher also tries to solve this problem

by using the notion of an infinite analysis.

His approach to the problem,

however, is somewhat different from Parkinson’s.
In explaining his view of Leibniz’s theory of contingency, Rescher

makes use of three principles:

The Principle of Sufficient Reason,

The Principle of Identity or The Principle of Contradiction, and The

Principle of Perfection or of The Best.^
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
if a proposition is true

,

,

According to Rescher, The

"is a principle asserting that,

then it is possible to show that its predi-

cate is contained in its subject by means of an analysis or demonstration

which need not terminate but may proceed In infinitum (in which case
God alone can carry out the analysis fully)," (Res2

p.

27).

In other

words, it is the principle that all true propositions are analytic.
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The Principle of Identity (PI) is
that all "finitely

sitions are necessarily true.

1
'

analytic propo-

By a "finitely" analytic proposition

Rescher means a proposition such that
the concept of the predicate
can be shown to be included in the
concept of the subject in a finite

number of steps.

The Principle of Perfection (PP) is the
principle

that every "infinitely" analytic
proposition is contingently true.

An infinitely analytic proposition is one
such that it would take an
infinite analysis in order to show that the
concept of the predicate
is included in the concept of the subject.

Although Rescher’

is somewhat unclear, he basically wants to
hold that

(PP)

s

view

is Leibniz's

principle of contingence and, in accord with (PP) God selects
the
best possible world.

In order to understand this view we must consider

what Rescher says about possible worlds and perfection.

According to Rescher, every "possible substance" is a member of
some possible world, and each of these possible substances has a com-

plete concept which involves its entire history and mirrors the world
of which it is a member.

While every possible substance mirrors the

world of which it is a member, different substances in that world have

different degrees of "clarity" at a given state.
time in the development of a substance.

A state is a particular

At a given state a substance

in a world "perceives" the rest of that world with a certain degree
of clarity.

"Let us call the degree of clarity with which at a given

state a possible substance mirrors its universe its amount of perfection
for that state ,"

(Res2

p.

29).

The amount of perfection a possible

substance has is the total amount of perfection it has for all states.
The amount of perfection of a possible world is the total amount of
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perfection of all possible substances which
are members of that possible
world. According to The Principle of
Perfection, "God selects that

universe for which the amount of perfection
6
is a maximum."

Rescher

claims that this enables us to understand
the infinite analyticity
of contingent truths.

To help us understand the connection between

The Principle of Perfection and infinite
analysis, we first look at

Rescher

s

account of the nature of analysis.

Rescher says:
The Leibnizian 'analysis" of a proposition
about a substance consists of two steps:
1.
fo scrutinize the list of properties of
the substance that is the subject of the
proposition in order to determine what
is and what is not included in its complete individual notion.
2.
To determine whether the properties imputed by the predicate of the proposition
to the substance are in fact included
in this list (or is a derivative of
properties so included).
(Resl p. 23)

Rescher'

s

idea seems to be that the analysis of a sentence like, "Adam

has blond hair," consists of listing the properties contained in the

concept of Adam and checking to see if the property of blond hair is
a member of the list.

will be infinite.

In certain cases Rescher claims that the analysis

In particular, he claims that the analysis of a

contingent proposition is infinite.

He says:

Since true contingent propositions concern contingent
existents
the concatenation of subject and predicate asserted by them depends on the nature of existence.
In this way the principle of contingent existence,
the Principle of Perfection, enters into their analysis.
It is via this principle and comparison of perfection
of an infinite number of possible worlds involved in
it, that an infinite process is imported into the
analysis of contingent truths ... A truth of fact is
.

.

.

43

such that the state of affairs it
asserts is one
elonging to the best of all possible
worlds, hence
its analysis, which consists in
showing that this is
indeed so, requires an infinite process
of comparison.
(Resl PP

.

37-38)

Rescher is not speaking quite accurately
when he suggests that for Leibniz
all true contingent propositions concern
existents
of God.
Gi

motlon

.

with the exception

Leibniz says that the laws of nature, in
particular the laws
>

are also contingent, and the concatenation of
subject and

predicate asserted by them can not be thought to
depend on the nature
of existence in the way a sentence like,

be thought to depend.

"Adam has blond hair", might

This is a possible problem for Rescher, if his

account of contingency excludes such propositions.

Rescher suggests

here that a sentence is contingently true if the state of
affairs it

asserts is one belonging to the best of all possible worlds.

But the

connection between this view and the idea that contingent truths require
an infinite analysis is far from clear.

Perhaps a better understanding

of The Principle of Perfection will clarify matters.
It is obvious that The Principle of Perfection plays an important

role in Rescher'

s

account of contingence in Leibniz.

definitively states this principle.

Yet Rescher never

Sometimes he says that it is the

principle that every infinitely analytic proposition is contingently
true,

g

while other times he says:
This principle is a formulation of the thesis that,
in His decision of creation, God acted in the best
possible way; the actual world is that one among
the possible worlds which an infinite process of
comparison showed to be the best.
The existence of an objective criterion of
goodness is a crucial feature of this principle.
(Resl p.

28)
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While these two statements of the
principle are in some ways connected,
they clearly do not say the same thing.
Rescher also says that The
Principle of Perfection enters into the
analysis of propositions concerning contingent existents.

If

the principle were simply that
every

infinitely analytic proposition is
contingently true, it would be very

difficult to see how it could enter into any
analysis of a contingent

proposition like Adam has blond hair.

As it is, seeing how The Principle

of Perfection enters into any analysis
is going to be difficult.

It

would be more reasonable to say that according
to Rescher that every

infinitely analytic proposition is contingently true
follows somehow
from The Principle of Perfection.

The Principle of Perfection is,

then,

that God acted in the best possible way when he created
this world.

What role does this principle play in Reseller's account of
contingent
truths?

Rescher says that:

A given proposition concerning a contingent
existence is true, and its predicate is indeed
contained in its subject, if the state of affairs
characterized by this inclusion is such that it
involves a greater amount of perfection for the
world than any other possible state.
(Res2

p.

30)

In her review of Rescher 's book, Margaret D. Wilson suggests one

way of understanding him. g

The sentence, "Adam has blond hair," is

contingent because God created the best of all possible worlds and in
doing so caused the concept of Adam to contain the property of having
blond hair.

Adam could have lacked the property of having blond hair

because Adam's concept need not contain that property.

Adam's concept

contains the property of having blond hair because God chose the best
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of all possible worlds, but if God had
chosen a different world,

then

Adam’s concept would not contain the property
of having blond hair.
This way of understanding Rescher would seem to
account for contingency
in Leibniz in that the proposition that Adam
has blond hair is true

because God chose the best of all possible worlds, but
would have
been false had God chosen a different world.

Wilson criticizes this

view by pointing out that Leibniz tells us that all concepts
were
completely formed in God's understanding before God decided which
world to create.

The concept of blond hair is included in the concept

of Adam whether or not God chose to create this world.

Yet given

the above account of Rescher it would seem that the concept of Adam
is not completely formed until God decides to create this world,

for

the concept of blond hair could have or could have not been included

in the concept of Adam, depending on which world God decided to create.

Since God decided to create this world, the concept of blond hair is

included in the concept of Adam.

Wilson comments, "This seems to

imply that God, by creating the world in accordance with the Principle
of Perfection causes certain predicates to be included in certain

subject-concepts that would not be included were it not for his de-

cision."^

This view explicitly contradicts what Leibniz says about

complete concepts in, among other places, his correspondence with
Arnauld.

There Leibniz says that God created a completely determined

Adam in the sense that the concept of Adam, before God created Adam,
included all the properties Adam would ever have.^

Thus even if the

above view allows for a distinction between necessary and contingent
truths, it is not a view that Leibniz would hold or could consistently hold.
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While Wilson seems to be correct in her criticisms of
the view
presented, it seems incorrect to attribute that view
to Rescher.

While

Rescher's statement of his views is very unclear, and hence
open to
numerous interpretations, he does explicitly say, "The existence
of
an objective criterion of goodness for possible worlds wholly
inde-

pendent of the will of God is a crucial feature of this principle,"
(Resl p. 28; emphasis added).
in worlds,

1

Given Rescher's account of perfection

it is clear that Rescher considers the worlds totally

formed before God makes a choice.

Thus, while Wilson's account of

Rescher is one way to interpret him, it seems unfair to him.
There is a more plausible way to understand Rescher than the

account that Wilson presents.

contingency of true sentences

Rescher seems to believe that the
is

closely connected with both The

Principle of Perfection and the notion of infinite analysis.

At one

point Rescher says, "A truth of fact is such that the state of affairs
it asserts is one belonging to the best of all possible worlds.

Rescher clearly did not mean for this to be a sufficient condition for
the contingency of true propositions, since all necessary truths are

also such that the state of affairs they assert belongs to the best
of all possible worlds.

But this condition, combined with the idea

that contingent truths are infinitely analytic, allows us to present
a reasonable view for Rescher.

Let 'S($)' be 'the state of affairs

expressed by $, or the state of affairs asserted by the proposition
expressed by $'.
(DF1)

The view being suggested can be expressed as follows:

A sentence
and only if

4>

expresses a contingent true proposition if
S(4>)

occurs in the best of all possible worlds
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and
(DF2)

$

is infinitely analytic.

A sentence

expresses a necessary true proposition
if

$

and only if S($) occurs in the
best of all possible worlds
and $ is finitely analytic.
(DF3)

A sentence

expresses a contingent false proposition if

$

and only if either S($) does not occur
in the best of all

possible worlds and

$

is infinitely analytic,

or not-$ is

infinitely analytic.
(DF4)

A sentence

expresses a necessary false proposition if

$

and only if either S($) does not occur in the
best of all

possible worlds and

$

is finitely analytic,

or not-$ is

finitely analytic.

A sentence

$

is

finitely analytic just in case the concept of the

predicate is included in the concept of the subject and the analysis
of $ occurs in a finite number of steps.

A sentence

$

is infinitely

analytic just in case the concept of the predicate is included in the
concept of the subject and the analysis of

number of steps.

^

$

does not occur in a finite

Reseller's account of the nature of analysis has

already been described

,

^

and it is being used here as Rescher uses it.

The view explicated by (DF1) through (DF4) appears to correspond

with the view that, according to Rescher, saves Leibniz from the objection that God necessarily created the best of all possible worlds.

In

order to understand Reseller's proposed solution, we must make his dis-

tinction between "metaphysical perfection" and "moral perfection".

Metaphysical perfection is the amount of potential for existence a
thing has, while moral perfection is the amount of "goodness" a thing
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possesses.

According to Rescher, Leibniz believes that God is neces-

sarily perfect, but perfect in the metaphysical sense.

Thus it is

supposed to follow from God's essence alone that he exists.^
is also

God

morally perfect, but his moral perfection is not necessary.

Rescher says:
God's moral perfection (goodness) has a sufficient
reason, and this in turn another, e_t caetera ad
infinitum but this sequence of sufficient reasons
converges on God's metaphysical perfection. Or,
putting this another way, we can say that God’s
moral perfection is indeed a logical consequence
of His metaphysical perfection, but a consequence
which no finite deduction suffices to elicit. In
this way, as Leibniz insists, the proposition asserting God's moral perfection is contingent; ...
;

(Res2 p.

38)

So, according to Rescher the proposition that God is morally perfect
is infinitely analytic,

and since it is true in the best of all pos-

sible worlds, it is contingent.

But while the analysis of the prop-

osition that God is morally perfect is infinite, Rescher tells us
that it, "converges on God's metaphysical perfection," and is indeed
a logical consequence of God's metaphysical perfection.

Thus far

we have not dealt with the problem of the nature of an infinite analysis, but it is a crucial aspect of the view being suggested.
In describing his account of an analysis, Rescher points out that

in certain cases an analysis of a proposition may be nonterminating

"Analysis of certain propositions will not result in explicit identities;
they are only virtually identical, in that their analysis comes closer

and closer to yielding, but never actually yields, an actual identity.
In a case like this,

the analysis "converges" on some actual identity.

But Rescher never explains how an analysis of a proposition can be
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said to "converge" on an explicit
identity (by which he n,eans a
logical
18
trut
It is particularly difficult
).
to understand given Reseller’s

account of the nature of analysis.

Suppose an analysis is performed

on the proposition that Adam has
blond hair.

On Rescher's view, one

would start listing the properties in
the concept of Adam to determine

whether or not the property of having blond
hair is on the list.

Even

if the number of properties in the
concept is infinite , 19 if Adam has

blond hair then the property of having blond
hair will, sooner or later,

appear on the list.
the list,

When the property of blond hair does appear on

there will only be a finite number of properties
before it.

Thus we can show that Adam has blond hair in a
finite number of operations.

This same process could be repeated for any "contingent"
true proposition, and hence it appears that all true propositions are
necessary.
On Rescher

s

view it is not clear that there are any infinite analyses,

let alone one that "converges" on some proposition.
It

might be possible to avoid this difficulty by changing Rescher’s

account of the nature of an analysis to something which would make

more sense out of the idea of an analysis converging.

However,

the

only plaudible way to do this seems to be the way discussed earlier
in the account of Parkinson, and we have already seen the problems

involved in that.

There appears to be no complete, coherent way of

accounting for contingency in Leibniz in terms of infinite analysis
alone.

Rescher's account of Leibniz is more obscure than that of

Leibniz himself, and even under what seems the most reasonable inter-

pretation of Rescher we do not seem to have a solution

to the problem.

In the next chapter we will discuss a view of Leibniz presented by

Benson Mates which ignores the notion of an infinite
analysis and
concentrates solely on Leibniz’s view of possible worlds
to avoid
the analytic-necessary problem.
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CHAPTER III

Benson Mates’ views on Leibniz on necessity and
contingency differ

significantly from the views of Rescher and Parkinson.

In his expli-

cation of necessity and contingency Mates concentrates
solely on Leibniz'
views of concepts and possible worlds and mentions
Leibniz's discussions of infinite and finite analysis only to point out
the difficulty
in understanding them.

Mates also presents his views on Leibniz

more formally in his paper "Leibniz on Possible Worlds" in terms
of
a semantics for a formal language.

In this chapter, Mates'

semantics

will be presented, followed by a discussion of some of the Leibnizian
aspects of it, and, finally, some possible difficulties with his system

will be considered.
In presenting Mates'

semantics it is assumed that we have a modal

predicate calculus with identity.
defined in some usual way.

The notion of well-formedness is

We will, following Mates, restrict the

predicates to one-place predicates (except identity).
Mates' system is based on the Leibnizian notions of "complete

individual concepts", "compossibility"

,

and "possible worlds".

"A

comp lete individual concept is a set of simple properties satisfiable

by exactly one thing and containing all the simple properties that

would belong to that thing if it existed," (Ml

p.

254).

Compossibility

(for Mates) is an equivalence relation which partitions the set of all

complete individual concepts into equivalence classes, which are possible worlds

.

There are a denumerably infinite number of possible

worlds, each containing infinitely many concepts, also denumerable.

2
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The individual constants and
one-place predicates are interpreted
as follows:

Let

f

be a function that maps the
set of individual constants
onto

the set of complete individual
concepts (if a is an individual
constant,

then f(°0 is the complete individual
concept associated with a),

f

also maps the set of singulary
predicates onto the set of simple pro-

pertxes (if F is a singulary predicate,
then f(F) is the simple pro-

perty associated with F)
Mates then defines the relation true of in
the following way:
For any sentence $, formulas

if/,

X

,

constants a, b, predicate F

(other than identity), variable a, and
possible world W, then:
(i)

If $ is Fa,

f(a)
(ii)

(iv)

f( a ) and

e

W.

If $ is M>,
If $ is

then $ is true of W iff f(a) is f(b) and

(ip

then $ is true of W iff
-*

x),

not true of W or
(v)

e

e W.

If $ is a=b,
f (b)

(iii)

then $ is true of W iff f(F)

If $ is

(a)\p

,

ip

is not true of W.

then $ is true of W iff either
X

then

is true of W,
$

is true of

If $

isn

p

or both.

W iff

t^a/b is

true of

W for every individual constant b such that f(b)
(vi)

is

i

then $ is true of W iff

ip

e

W.^

is true of every

possible world W'
A sentence is a necessary truth iff it is true of all possible worlds.
In Mates' system truth is defined "intensionally" as opposed to

"extensionally"

.

In an extensional account of truth, constants are

assigned to objects from the domain (if assigned at all), and predicates
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are assigned sets of objects which are
called the "extension of the

predicate".

An atomic sentence is true if the object
assigned to the

constant (if there is one) is a member of the
extension of the predicate.
In an intensional system, predicates are
not assigned to sets of

objects, but rather they are assigned to
properties.

Properties are

the intension of the predicate, and are taken
as primitive.

Depending

on the system one wanted, constants could then
be assigned to sets of

properties as in Mates' system.

An atomic sentence is true provided

that the intension of the predicate is a member of
the set assigned
to

the constant.

in Leibniz.

It is this intensional notion of truth that we find

He says:

In fact when I consult the conception which I have
of all true propositions, I find that every necessary or contingent predicate, every past, present,
or future predicate, is involved in the concept of
the subject, and I ask no more.
(OC p. 117)

The concept of the predicate is always in the subject of a true proposition.
(OC p. 126)

Always in every affirmative proposition whether
veritable, necessary or contingent, the concept
of the predicate is comprised in some sort in that
of the subject.
Either the predicate is in the
subject or else I do not know what truth is.(OC p. 132)
If one looks at truth conditions in Mates'

that this view of truth is indeed included.

sentence, "Adam is the first man".

semantics, one can see

Consider, for example, the

Since Mates also wants to account

for certain modal notions (i.e., necessity), all sentences have a truth-

value relative to a possible world, but for our present purposes this
point is not crucial and we can consider the example sentences relative
to

this world.

"Adam is the first man," is true (of this world) provided
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that the property of being the first
man is a member of (or is contained

m)

the complete individual concept of
Adam, and that concept is a

member of this world.

If we symbolize the sentence as
Fa where a stands

for "Adam" and F for "is the first man",
Fa is true (of this world)
if and only if f(F)

(i.e.,

the property assigned to the predicate
F)

is a member of f(a)

(i.e.,

the concept assigned to the constant a),

and f (a) is a member of this world.

Mates

Thus, in case of atomic sentences

system agrees with Leibniz in intensionality of truth.

However,

Leibniz believes that the concept of the predicate is
included in the
concept of the subject in all true propositions.

Leibniz would hold

that the proposition that every human is an animal is
true just in

case the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of
the
subject.

But in this case it is much more difficult to see how his

definition is supposed to work.
Consider the two sentences, "Adam is human", and "Every human is
an animal".

In the first sentence the concept of the subject can be

thought of as a set of properties.

Leibniz says that for every substance

there is a complete individual concept which contains all its properties.
He says:

We are able to say that this is the nature of
an individual substance or of a complete being, namely
to afford a conception so complete that the concept
shall be sufficient for the understanding of it and
for the deduction of all the predicates of which the
substance is or may become the subject.
(OC p. 13)
.

.

.

In the sentence, "Adam is human",

the name "Adam" refers to some indi-

vidual for which there is a complete concept.

We can thus talk about

the complete concept of Adam which contains all and only those properties
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which Adam has.

Given that the language we are
using has the appropriate

connections, the concept of the subject
of the sentence "Adam is human"
is the complete concept of Adam.

The concept of the predicate in
the

sentence "Adam is human" is the property
of being human.

The sentence

IS true provided that the
complete concept of Adam contains the
property

of being human.

Leibniz indicates that there are more complete
individual concepts
than there are or will be substances.

This is because there are com-

plete individual concepts which were never
realized by God; i.e., God
never created a substance which corresponded
to them.

Mates takes

possible worlds to be constituted of these unrealized
concepts, rather
than

possible substances".

individuals

or

But Leibniz often speaks about "possible

possible persons", which God never created.^*

Mates

suggests that we understand Leibniz as talking about unrealized
concepts
rather than

Mates

possible substances" when he speaks of "possible persons".

suggestion is a good one.

possible persons

Leibniz most frequently refers to

when he is discussing God's choice in creation, saying

that God chooses to create one individual from among many possible indi-

viduals.

But Leibniz also refers to God’s choice as a selection from

among concepts.

He says,

Adam as possible when

I

"...

I

consider the individual concept of

maintain that among an infinite of possible

concepts God has selected a certain Adam," (OC pp. 107-108).

This indi-

cates that Leibniz did not distinguish between "possible persons" and

what he calls "possible concepts".

Leibniz does not believe concepts

are possible, in the sense that God could or could not create them as
he chose.

As he says in his discussion of the complete concept of Adam,
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Now,

there is no ground for doubting that
God can form such a concept,

or rather,

that he finds it already formed in
the region of possibilities

that is to say, in his understanding,"

(OC p.

111).

So, by "possible

concept" we should understand Leibniz as
meaning a concept which God
could r ealize

.

Leibniz further indicates that by "possible
persons"

he is referring to concepts and not
"possible substances" when he says:
In order to call anything possible it is
enough
that we are able to form a notion of it when
it is
only in the divine understanding, which is, so
to
speak, the region of possible realities.
Thus in

speaking of possibles, I am satisfied if veritable
propositions can be formed concerning them. (OC p. 131)

A proposition is true provided that the concept of the
subject of the

proposition contains the concept of the predicate of the proposition.
Thus, in order to form true propositions concerning possibles
we need

only speak of concepts, and not of "possible substances".
is satisfied with that,

If Leibniz

there is no reason why we should not be.

There-

fore, we will agree with Mates' suggestion and understand Leibniz to

be referring to unrealized complete concepts when he speaks of possible individuals.

Given this view of possible individuals it is natural
as Mates suggests,

to assume,

that possible worlds are made up not of individuals,

but rather of concepts, and only in the real world are these concepts

actualized.

Not all concepts are actualized for the reason that not

all possibles are, as Leibniz puts it, "compossible"

"compossible" Leibniz means compatible.

.

Intuitively, by

For example, if concept x

contains the properties of being the first man and having red hair,
and concept y contains the properties of being the first man and having
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blond hair, it seems reasonably
clear that x and y could not be
realised
together.
In any world there can be only one
first man and he can have
either red hair or blond hair, but not
both.
Thus Leibniz holds each

world to be a collection of compossible
possibles.

He says:

The Universe is only the collection
of a certain
kind of compossibles and the actual
Universe is
the collection of all existant possibles,
i.e.,
of that which form the richest
compound.
And as
there are different combinations of possibles,
some
better than others, there are many possible
Universes, each collection of compossibles making
one of them.
;

p

223)

Mates tries to incorporate the Leibnizian idea that
possible

worlds are simply collections of compossibles in his
semantics.
says,

Mates

Individual concepts are said to be compossible if they are

capable of joint realization," (Ml

p.

511).

Mates later continues:

One sees, therefore, that the relation of
compossibility between individual concepts, unlike
that of consistency between sentences or propositions,
is transitive; since it is also reflexive and
symmetrical it is an equivalence relation. As
noted above, the possible worlds are ’maximal*
or ’closed' with respect to this relation; so
they are just the equivalence classes into which
the relation of compossibility partitions the
entire class of complete individual concepts. Thus,
each such concept belongs to one and only one
possible world, and two concepts are compossible
if and only if they belong to the same possible
world.
(Ml pp. 511-512)

Mates appears to be on the right track, but there are some difficulties
with his treatment of compossibility.

According to Mates, compossibility

is a two-place relation among concepts.

in case X and Y can be realized together.

X is compossible with Y just

Mates says the compossibility

relation is reflexive and symmetrical, which it clearly is, and also
transitive.

Initially, it is difficult to see why the relation would
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be transitive.

Surely it could be the case that X and
Y can be realized

together and Y and Z be realized together,
and X and Z can not be realized
together.

Suppose X and Z both contain the property
of being the only

man seven feet tall and they differ with
respect to some other property.
Further suppose that Y contains the property
of being six feet tall as

well as others.

There is no inconsistency in X and Y being realized

together, nor in Y and Z being realized together,
yet it is clear that
X and Z cannot be realized together.

Since counter-examples of this

type seem so obvious, why does Mates believe compossibility
to be tran-

sitive and hence an equivalence relation?

In a later paper, "individuals

and Modality in the Philosophy of Leibniz", Mates considers this
point

and says:
It is blocked by the Leibnizian doctrine that in
the actual world and in every other possible world,
each concept 'mirrors' or 'expresses' all the other
individual concepts in that world.
Each individual
of the actual world is related to all the others,

and every relation is 'grounded' in simple attributes
of the things related; the same is true of the other
possible worlds as well.
(M2 p. 91)

Mates is correct in believing that Leibniz holds that every concept

mirrors or expresses the world of which it is a member.

Leibniz often

says things like, "Now every individual substance of this universe

expresses in its concept the universe into which it has entered," (OC
p.

109).

But this relation of mirroring between concepts is obscure.

Mates believes that the mirroring relation will yield the result
that compossibility is an equivalence relation.

concept A mirrors concept

B,

The idea is that if

then for any property P that is contained

in B it can be shown from A that P is contained in B.

For example,
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m

the case suggested above Y might
contain the property of being six

feet tall and X is the only man seven
feet tall.

be compossible with

Z,

Y would no longer

since Y cannot be realized without X's
being

realized, and X and Z are not compossible.

Given this idea of mir-

roring, Mates is right that compossibility
will be an equivalence

relation which partitions the set of complete
concepts into equivalence
classes.

But at this point we are faced with another
difficulty.

is not clear

It

that we should identify possible worlds with
these equiv-

alence classes, which is what Mates wants to do.
The problem with this is that while the members of
a given equiv-

alence class are pair-wise compossible, the set itself may
not be possible (i.e., not all the members can be realized together).
the following case:

Suppose X contains, among other things, being the

only man at place P at time
Q at time

t

t,

Y contains being the only man at place

when X is the only man at place

being the only man at place Q at time
concepts.

Consider

t,

P at time t,

where X, Y and

and Z contains
Z are

distinct

X is compossible with Y and Y is compossible with Z and Z

is compossible with X, yet X, Y and Z cannot be realized together.

One

might say that the possible worlds are just certain subsets of the equivalence classes, but then there is a problem about worlds being "maximal"
in the appropriate sense.

If worlds are not maximal,

then it seems

clear that a concept can be a member of two distinct worlds.

It is

more likely that Mates would say that mirroring handles this problem,
and X, Y and Z cannot really be pair-wise compossible.

Whether or not

the relation of mirroring can do this depends in part on how one defines

mirroring, which Mates does not do.

However, for present purposes we

will assume one can define
mi rrorl „ 8 i„ tha appropriate
Kay and gQ
to consider Mates
account of necessary truth.

^

In order to understand
Mates* account of necessary
truth we must

again briefly look at his
account of truth for atomic
sentences. As
pointed out earlier, a sentence
is true relative to a
given possible
world.
The sentence, -Adam has
blond hair," is true of a world
(say)
Wi jUSt

^

0356 the C ° nCe P t of blond

^ir

is included in the concept

of Adam and the concept of
Adam is a member of W..

The sentence is

necessarily true just in case it
is true of all possible worlds.
It
can be easily seen that on Mates'
account of Leibniz it is not the
case that all true sentences are
necessary.

Consider the sentence,

Adam has blond hair," and suppose
Adam really did have blond hair
and he really did exist.
The sentence, "Adam has blond hair,"
is true
of this world since the concept of
Adam is a member of this world and

has the concept of blond hair as a member.

However, it will not be

true of all possible worlds because the
concept of Adam will not be
a member of all possible worlds.

The reason the concept of Adam is

not a member of all possible worlds is that
possible worlds are simply
the equivalence classes which are partitioned
off the set of all con-

cepts by the relation of compossibility

.

Thus Adam's concept is only

a member of one of those worlds, namely this
one.

Thus if the sentence

"Adam has blond hair," is true of this world, it must be
false of all
other possible worlds.

If the sentence is true of one world and false

of all others, it is contingent.

This does not mean that all sentences

in which the concept of the subject is not a member of a given world

are false of that world.

Complex sentences can be true of a world
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even though the concept of the subject is not
a member of that world.

Consider the sentence, "Either Caesar crossed the
Rubicon or Caesar
did not cross the Rubicon."

This sentence will be true of all pos-

sible worlds (and hence a necessary truth) even
though the concept of

Caesar is a member of only one world.

To see this, consider the world

(presumably this one) which has as a member the concept of
Caesar.

In

this world the sentence will be true because Caesar did
in fact cross

the Rubicon, thus one of the disjuncts is satisfied.

The concept of

Caesar is not a member of any other world, and thus the other
disjunct

will be satisfied in those worlds, since in order to satisfy it, it
only has to be the case that the concept of Caesar not be a member
of the world.

truth.

Thus the sentence in question does express a necessary

However, it should be noted that only complex sentences can

express necessary truths; all true atomic sentences are contingent.
Basically, the reason it turns out that all true atomic sentences
are contingent is that for an atomic sentence to be true of a world
the concept of the subject must be a member of the world in question.

Mates treats truth this way in his semantics because of a view he attributes to Leibniz about non-referring names.

In his first paper,

Mates presents the Leibnizian principle, "Nothing has no properties,"
and says, "The point is rather that Leibniz’s advocacy of this principle

amounts in practice to a decision to regard as false every atomic

sentence that contains a nondenoting name," (Ml

p.

514).

However, it

is far from clear that Leibniz actually held this view, and the evidence

Mates presents to support it is inconclusive.
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Mates bases his view that Leibniz believed that
all sentences

with nondenoting names are false, in part, upon
the following passage
in Leibniz:
Hoc autem praesupponit negari omnem propositionem,
quam ingreditur terminus qui non est res. Ut scilicet
maneat omnem propositionem vel veram vel falsam esse,
falsam autem omnem esse cui deest constantia subjecti,
seu terminus realis.
(C p. 393 )

Mates presents the following translation of the above:
This however presupposes denying every proposition
in which there is a term that does not exist.
In
order, namely, to keep (the principle) that every
proposition is true or false, (I consider) as false
every proposition that lacks an existent subject
or real term.
(M2 p. 93)

Parkinson, in his book Leibniz

:

Logical Papers

exact same passage somewhat differently.

,

translates the

His translation reads:

But this presupposes that every proposition which
has as an ingredient a term which is not a thing
is denied.
So it remains that every proposition
is either true or false, but that every proposition
which lacks a consistent subject, i.e. a real term,
is false.
(P2 p. 82)

The differences between the translations of Mates and Parkinson
are important ones.

In particular, Mates translates "constantia subjecti"

as "existent subject" while Parkinson translates it as "consistent

subject".

This difference in translation is highly significant.

If

Parkinson is correct, then it seems that Leibniz is going to consider
false every atomic sentence in which there is an inconsistent term.

6

By "inconsistent term" we mean a term which has associated with it a

concept that is not consistent.

^

Thus, for example, the sentence, "The

round square is round," would be false.

Yet this does not say anything

about terms which do not -refer in the real world but do refer in some
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other possible world.

If, on the other hand. Mates is correct
in his

translation, and we assume that by "existent subject"
Leibniz means a

subject such that its referent exists in the real world,
then Leibniz
is saying he will consider false every atomic
sentence in which there
is a term which does not refer in this world.

Mates generalizes this

idea and says that if the concept of the subject of an atomic
sentence
is not a member of the world at which the sentence is
being evaluated,

then the sentence is false.

But is Mates correct in his interpretation

of Leibniz, or is Parkinson closer to what Leibniz meant?

The key to understanding Leibniz here seems to be when Leibniz

indicates that

constantia subjecti" means the same as "terminus realis".^

It seems that for Leibniz "real term" means nothing more than "possible

term", that is, a term which has a consistent concept.

If in fact

Leibniz does mean this, then Parkinson's interpretation is the correct
one.

Moreover, there is other evidence to indicate that Leibniz did

not want to say that all atomic sentences without an existent subject

are false.

In discussing his view of logic as opposed to the view of

The Scholastics, he says, "However,

I

have preferred to consider universal

concepts, i.e., ideas, and their combinations, as they do not depend
on the existence of individuals," (P2

p.

20).^

This is part of the

reason why Leibniz wanted an intensional account of truth rather than
an extensional one.

Mates considers Leibniz's holding the principle,

"Nothing has no properties," as evidence that Leibniz wanted to consider, "false every atomic sentence that contains a non-denoting name,"
(Ml p.

514).

But given what Leibniz says about nothing, it appears

that there is more evidence for Parkinson's position.

Leibniz says,
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''Nihil est quicquid nominari potest,

re,

sine mente sonus.

That is.

cogitari non potest, nomen sine
Nothing is that which can be named

but can not be conceived; a name without a thing, a sound without a

meaning.

This suggests that names which have associated with them

a concept which can not be realized

denote nothing.

(i.e., an inconsistent concept)

Atomic sentences containing such names will be false.

One intuitive way of understanding the relationship between names such
as "Adam" and the complete concept of Adam is that the concept is the

meaning of the name or the intension of the name.

The referent, deno-

tation, or extension of the name is the man Adam.

Names such as "Pegasus"

which do not refer or have an extension in this world are still considered real terms because they have a consistent intension or meaning.
Terms such as "the round square" are not real terms, since the meaning
of the term is inconsistent.

It seems reasonably clear that when

Leibniz speaks of nothing as a name without a thing, the names he has
in mind are like "the round square".

Thus, when Leibniz says he is

going to consider false every proposition which lacks a constantia
sub jecti

,

we should understand him as saying that atomic sentences

containing inconsistent terms are false.
One of the results of Mates' misinterpretation of Leibniz is the

second conjunct in his truth conditions for atomic sentences.

By it-

self, this is not a very powerful objection to Mates' system.

However,

it leads to certain results in Mates'

system which Leibniz would find

unacceptable
There are at least two results of Mates' system that it seems
Leibniz would disagree with, and one result of possible disagreement.
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They are,
O' Fa
a

+

D

(a)

the fact that in Mates

L(Ex) (x=a)

->

Fa]]

necessary truth. 12
t

(Ex)QFx

is always false,

is a necessary truth, and

Q

(c)

(a^a) is

It is not clear whether Leibniz would disagree

with Mates about the fact that (Ex)QFx is always false.
in

(b)

There are places

Leibniz which suggest that he held that certain properties of things

are possessed of necessity.

For example, he says, "I think that there

is something essential to individuals and more than you suppose.
is essential to substances to act,

It

to created substances to suffer,

minds to think, to bodies to have extension and motion." 13

to

But while

he says that there are certain things essential to individuals, it is

unclear whether he means particular individuals or individuals in
general.

The context suggests that he is referring to particulars,

but it is inconclusive.

with Arnauld

,

When discussing the problem of contingency

he says:

The other reply is that the sequence, in virtue of
which events follow from the hypothesis, is indeed
always certain, but that it is not always necessary
by a metaphysical necessity, as is that instance
which is founded in M. Arnaud's example:
that God,
resolving to create me, could not avoid creating a
nature capable of thought. The sequence is often
only physical and presupposes certain free decrees
of God.

.

.

.

(OC pp.

104-105)

This passage suggests that Leibniz believes he has the property of

being capable of thought necessarily.

Leibniz says that from the hypo-

thesis, which is that God will create a certain Adam, and hence the

world, all the events which follow are certain, but not all are necessary.
Some are contingent, and some are necessary, such as Leibniz's being

capable of thought.

The interesting point here is that Leibniz wants

to distinguish between his having the property of being capable of
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thought and his having other properties, such as the
property of having

black hair.

We suggest that Leibniz believes that it is
metaphysically

necessary that God, resolving to create Leibniz, could not
avoid Leibniz's
being capable of thought, yet it is not metaphysically necessary
that
God, resolving to create Leibniz, could not avoid Leibniz's
having

black hair.

How it is possible that Leibniz could consistently hold

this view is discussed in detail in the next chapter, but if he does,

then (a) would seem to be something Leibniz would reject.
This objection to Mates is based on one way of reading (Ex)CIFx,

namely, where the sentence is understood as saying there is something
in this world which is such that it has a certain property of necessity.

One could understand

(

Fx via Mates as saying there is something

Ex )

in this world such that in every world it exists and has a certain

property.

But if we read (Ex)OFx in the latter way, then how will

we translate the sentence, "There is something which is such that it

has property F of necessity"?

Surely this sentence should be translatable

into the formal language of a given system.
as its translation,

there appears to be no other way to translate it.

We can show that (b) is true by assuming
Fa is true of some world (say) W^.

Also (W)(W ^ W^
is

->

Unless we understand (Ex)OFx

f(a)

in only one world.

i

W)

,

Thus f(F)

O Fa.
e

Thus, by assumption

f(a) and f(a)

e

W^.

since every complete individual concept

This is because a world is an equivalence class

of complete individual concepts partitioned off the set of all complete

individual concepts by the relation of compossibility
says that (Ex) x=a

-+

Fa is true of every world.

.

Q[(Ex)(x=a)

(Ex)(x=a)

-*

-*

Fa is true

of a world just in case either (Ex)(x=a) is not true of that world or

FaJ
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Fa is true.

(Ex) (x-a)

is not true of a world just in case
there is

no constant b, such that f(b) is in that world
and b=a is true of that

world.
that

The only worlds of which b=a is true are those
worlds such

f (a)

is a member of them.

But as we have shown f(a) is a member

of only one world, hence for all worlds other
than W
is

true of them.

every world.
(c)

In W 1? Fa is true, hence (Ex) (x=a)

Thus

,

[(Ex) (x=a)

->

Fa[j

and finally,

7

a_)

is true of W.

is

true of W

.

If

Q (a=a)

is true of W,

Q

(a=a)

-*

O Fa

also is a necessary truth in Mates' system.

some W in w hich (c) is false, i.e., assume

(Ex) (x=a)

,

->

Fa

Fa is true of
->

o| (Ex) (x=a)->Faj

Assume there is

(for some constant

then for every W^,(a=a)

In order for a=a to be true of any world, f(a) must

be a member of that world.

Since f(a) is a member of only one world,

there will be some world such that f(a) is not a member of it.
it is false that for every W^,

(a=a)

is

true of W^.

Thus,

The reason I

point out that (b) and (c) are necessary truths in Mates' system is

because they indicate a difficulty in accepting Mates' system as an
appropriate Leibnizian semantics.

The difficulty is one of translation

and interpretation.

Consider the following sentence:
(1)

If it is possible

that Adam has black hair, then necessarily

if Adam exists, he has black hair.
It seems

that Leibniz would want to deny (1) since from the claim that

it is possible that Adam has black hair and Adam exists, it follows

that Adam in fact has black hair (I am assuming that Adam has blond

hair)

.

Leibniz would clearly agree that it is possible that Adam has

black hair and certainly wants

to claim

Adam exists (in the timeless

.
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sense), yet he would disagree that Adam in fact had
black hair.

Making

the appropriate assumptions about the predicate
letters and constant

letters in (b)

,

then it would appear that (b) is the translation into

the formal language of (1).

One would think that the semantics Mates

presents would reflect Leibniz's unacceptance of (1).

Mates

However, what

semantics reflects is that (b) interpreted in his system is

something Leibniz would accept.

(b)

interpreted in Mates' system

says, if the concept of Adam is a member of some world and that
concept

contains the property of having black hair, then in every world in

which the concept of Adam is a member (there is only one such world),
the concept contains the property of having black hair.

agree with this statement.

Leibniz would

It should also be pointed out that we

cannot conclude that Adam has black hair in

Mates'

system given our

assumptions about Adam (namely that he exists and has blond hair), since

O Fa

is false in the system.

Mates might deny that (b) is the trans-

lation of (1), but if he does it becomes unclear whether he can translate (1) at all.

be if not (b)

At least it is unclear what the translation would

A more likely response from Mates would be that this

.

is not a difficulty,

since Leibniz would not deny (1).

Mates would

hold that Leibniz would accept the claim that if Adam does not have

black hair, then it is not possible that he have black hair.
would base this view on some of the things Leibniz has

to say

complete concepts.
For example, Leibniz says:
in the life of any person, and even in
the whole universe, anything went differently from
what it has, nothing would prevent us from saying
.

.

.

if,

Mates
about
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that it was another person or another possible
universe which God had chosen.
It would then
indeed be another individual.
(M2

p.

105)

Mates would take the above quote as evidence for the claim
that Leibniz

held that if Adam lacked black hair, it is not possible
that he have

black hair.

Yet at many places Leibniz points out that just because

Adam has a certain property in his concept, it does not follow that

Adam has that property of necessity.

However, in order to show con-

clusively that (b) is a difficulty for a Leibnizian semantics, one
must point out a way of understanding Leibniz's views of complete
concepts, compossibility

,

and possible worlds, which makes the above

quote consistent with (1).

A way of understanding Leibniz which allows for this possibility
is suggested in the next two chapters.
to the problem

The problem with (c) is similar

with (b), although (c)'s being a necessary truth seems

to constitute a stronger objection to Mates than (b)'s being a neces-

sary truth.
If we let

a.

in (c) stand for "Adam",

then it appears that (c) is

the translation of:
(2)

It is possible that Adam not be Adam.

Even if Leibniz would not deny (1), it seems he would deny (2).

At

one time Leibniz tells us that all identical propositions are necessary.
He then later adds a condition for the truth of identical propositions.

He says:
As it is agreed that identical propositions
themselves can be trusted only in the case of real
concepts, so that no truth can be asserted without
fear of the opposite except concerning the reality
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—

of those concepts themselves
at any rate their
essential reality, though not their existential

reaiity

...

(P2 p

.

8 2)

Leibniz is saying that identical propositions can be
trusted only in
the cases where the concepts involved are consistent
or possible.^

But if the concepts involved are "real" concepts, then
the identical

proposition will be necessary.
Parkinson,

As mentioned in the discussion of

identical propositions for Leibniz are not just propo-

sitions expressed by identity sentences.

However it is clear that the

proposition that Adam is Adam is included among the propositions that
Leibniz calls

identical".

Thus, it is reasonably clear that Leibniz

would say that it is necessary that Adam is Adam, which contradicts
(2)

It seems unlikely that Mates would claim (c)

.

lation of (2)
(2)

.

is not

the trans-

A more likely response would be for him to deny that

is false.

Mates believes that just as all atomic sentences containing a

non-referring expression are false, so are all identity sentences
containing a non-referring expression.

He holds that Leibniz believes

identity sentences have "existential import".

That is, if an identity

sentence is true, then the terms in the identity sentence denote an
object.

Mates supports this view, in part, by pointing out that Leibniz

says, "Thus, if

I

say of an existing thing,

as if I were to say

'AB is an existent’;

'A is B’

e.g.,

it is the same

’Peter is a denier’,
I

i.e.,

,

O

’Peter denying is an existent' ,"(P2 p. 65).

clear that Leibniz here means what Mates is implying.

But it is not

Leibniz is only

discussing sentences in which the subject term refers to some object.
This passage does not tell us what Leibniz thought about sentences
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such as, "Pegasus is Pegasus".
is how to

The problem that Leibniz is
considering

handle the problem of existence given
his definition of truth.

Thus he says, immediately following
what is quoted above, "The question

here is how one is to proceed in analysing
this; i.e. whether the term
'Peter denying'

denial

involves existence, or whether 'Peter
existent' involves

or whether 'Peter'

involves both existence and denial, as
if

you were to say, 'Peter is an actual
denier', i.e. is an existent
denier; which is certainly true," (P2
p. 65).
says

Peter

In the end Leibniz

involves both existence and denial, but what we
are inter-

ested in is that Leibniz is not claiming that
all sentences (and

m

particular identity sentences) are false unless they
have

a term

which refers to an object.
There is additional evidence to support the belief that
Leibniz
thinks sentences of the form "a is a" are always true.

He says:

But if someone prefers signs to be used in
(154)
such a way that AB=AB, whether AB is a thing or not,
and that in the case in which AB is not a thing, B
and not-B can coincide namely, per impossible
do not object.
This will have as a consequence the
need to distinguish between a term and a thing or
entity
(155)
All things considered, then, it will perhaps
be better for us to say that, in symbols at least,
we can always put A=A, though nothing is usefully
concluded from this when A is not a thing.

—

—

(P2 p.

82)

When Leibniz says in (155) 'A is not a thing* it is clear from what he
says in (154) that he means A is impossible.

So, what Leibniz is sug-

gesting is that even if the term A has associated with it an inconsistent
concept we can still say "A=A"
a consistent concept,

.

If the term A has associated with it

then the sentence will be true.

Almost everything
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Leibniz says between (151) and (156) (P2
pp. 81-82) suggests that he
holds that "A=A" is true when the concept associated
with A is consistent.

Mates himself seems to agree to a certain extent when
he allows that
Pegasus is Pegasus" is true in some world even though
"Pegasus" does
not denote any object in any world on his view.

But Mates' view seems

too restrictive in its account of truth, and sentences
like (c) become

necessary truths.
Perhaps one should refrain from making any final judgements about
Mates' system until the merits of an alternative account can be compared

with it.

Mates does incorporate many of Leibniz's views in his system,

and he does suggest a way to avoid the problem of contingency.

In the

next chapter we will take a close look at Leibniz's views on these

matters and compare our interpretation of Leibniz with that of Parkinson,
Rescher and Mates.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1.

See M2 pp. 98-99.

2.

Ml pp. 524-525.

3.

For any formula ip, variable a, constant b, \pa/b is
the result
of replacing all occurrences of a in ip by occurrences
of
b.

4.

OC p. 80.

5.

NE p. 516.

6.

I say atomic sentence because we do not want Fa
and %Fa to both
be false.

7.

A concept is consistent provided that it is a subset of some
complete individual concept.

8.

A term a refers in a world W just in case the concept associated
with a is a member of W.

9.

Leibniz also says, "Is every universal negative, then impossible?
It seems that it is because it is understood of concepts, and
not of existing things; thus if I say that no man is an animal,
I do not understand this of existing men alone," (P2 p. 76).

10.

For another discussion of what "constantia subjecti" means in
this passage see Ishiguro, Hide", Leibniz ’s Philosophy of Logic
and Langua ge, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1972, pp. 128-130.
My conclusions on this subject are the same as Ishiguro’ s.

11.

Leibniz, G.W., Samtliche Schriften und Briefe herausgegeben von
der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaf ten zu Berlin, 1923,
Volume II, Series 6, p. 487.

12.

The symbols ’F and 'a* stand for any predicate letter and any
constant letter in Mates’ system respectively. Because there
will be no ambiguity between use and mention in discussing these
formulas, I have left off the quotation marks which would usually

,

f

accompany them.
13.

NE P* 331.

14.

OC pp.

19-20,

15.

P2

77.

P-

.

125-126.
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16.

For what Leibniz means by "essential reality" as
opposed to
existential reality", see P2 pp. 80-81.

17.

See P- 29.

18.

M2

pp.

.

94-95.

In the discussion of the various views that
certain philosophers

attributed to Leibniz and in the discussion about God,
various aspects
of Leibniz's position have been mentioned.

In this section will be

an attempt to present a coherent interpretation of
Leibniz which takes

into account most of the Leibnizian doctrines discussed.

We will try

to present as clearly as possible Leibniz's account of necessity
and

contingency, by considering what Leibniz says in various places and

presenting it in a consistent way.
a single major work on the topic,

being the Theodicy

,

Since Leibniz has never written
the closest thing coming to that

we must consider what Leibniz says in his cor-

respondence and in various articles.

The two major sources for the

view suggested for Leibniz are the correspondence with Arnauld and
the Theodicy

.

These are not the only sources, but they are the major

ones being considered.

In presenting this view there will be some

repetition of material presented in previous chapters, but this does
seem necessary to present a complete picture of Leibniz on this topic.
One of the basic views of Leibniz, and one he affirms often, is
his definition of truth.

Moreover, it is in part his definition of

truth which leads one to believe there is no contingency in Leibniz.
For, Leibniz says that a proposition is true just in case the concept
of

the predicate is included in the concept of the subject.

Leibniz holds that every true proposition is analytic.^
the difficulty:

if all true propositions are analytic,

In effect,

Herein lies
then surely

it follows that all true propositions are necessary, since all analytic
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propositions are necessary.
sitions are necessary.

Yet Leibniz denies that all

true propo-

On the face of it, this position
seems incon-

sistent, yet a close examination of
Leibniz's views will reveal there
is no inconsistency.

Truth is defined in terms of inclusion;
the concept of the pre-

dicate being included in the concept of
the subject.

m

As mentioned

the preceeding chapter, for Leibniz
the concept of the subject

can be thought of as a set of properties.

2

If the subject is an

individual thing, then the concept is complete.

Possible worlds

are sets of complete concepts as described in
the preceeding section.

Leibniz introduces "possible worlds" and the like
to explain creation
in part, but they also help in understanding
necessity.
In responding to a charge by Arnauld, Leibniz says:
If what I said be thought over a little it will
be found to be evident ex terminis
for by the
individual concept, Adam, I mean of course a perfect representation of a particular Adam who has
certain individual characteristics and is thus
distinguished from an infinity of possible persons
very similar to him yet for all that different
from him (as ellipses always differ from the circle,
however closely they may approach it). God has
preferred him to these others because it has pleased
God to choose precisely such an arrangement of
the universe, and everything which is a consequence
of this resolution is necessary only by hypothetical necessity and by no means destroys the freedom
of God nor that of the created spirits.
There is
a possible Adam whose posterity is of a certain
sort, and an infinity of other possible Adams whose
posterity would be otherwise; now is it not true
that these possible Adams (if we may speak of them
thus) differ among themselves and that God chose
only one who is precisely ours?
(OC p. 80)
:

If we ignore for the moment the difficulties presented in Chapter I

in connection with God, it seems that Leibniz is saying that what

;
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follows from God's decision to create this
world is not necessary (in
the metaphysical sense).

In particular, it is not the case that
all

true statements about Adam are necessary since
there are other "pos-

sible Adams" very similar to the real Adam which
God might have chosen
to realize instead of the real Adam.

The idea is that Adam does not

have (say) blond hair of necessity because there is a
possible Adam which
is very similar to the real Adam,

hair.

and this possible Adam lacks blond

This appears to be what Leibniz means when he says, "an
infinity

of other possible Adams whose posterity would be otherwise,"

(0C p.

80).

Leibniz does indicate that a sentence such as, "Adam has blond hair",
is hypothetically necessary.

By this Leibniz means that it is neces-

sary (in the metaphysical sense) that if God creates Adam, then Adam
has blond hair.

But this is hardly surprising, since included in the

concept of the real Adam is the concept of blond hair.
is going to realize the concept of the real Adam,

have blond hair since it is in his concept.

Given that God

the real Adam must

Thus, the reason it is

contingent that Adam has blond hair is that there are these "possible
Adams" which are similar to the real Adam yet lack blond hair.

But does

it even make sense to talk about "possible Adams"?

In the preceding section it was argued for that Leibniz’s "pos-

sible individuals" were unrealized complete individual concepts in other

possible worlds.^

When such terms as "possible persons", or "possible

Adams" are used, no more is meant than unrealized complete individual
concepts in other possible worlds (except in the case of the "possible
Adam" or "possible person" which is in fact actual).

Arnauld objects

to Leibniz's position that there are an "infinity of other possible
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Adams

on the grounds that such a view in conjunction
with Leibniz's

view of complete individual concepts is inconsistent.

Arnauld says:

Moreover, Monsieur, I do not see how, in taking
Adam as an example of a unitary nature, several
possible Adams can be thought of.
It is as though
I should conceive of several possible me's;
a thing
which is certainly inconceivable. For I am not
able to think of myself without considering myself
as a unitary nature, a nature so completely distinguished from every other existent or possible
being that I am as little able to conceive of several
me s as to think of a circle all of whose diameters
are not equal.
The reason is that these various
me's are different, one from the other, else there
would not be several of them. There would have
to be, therefore, one of these me's which would not
be me, an evident contradiction.
(OC p. 94)

Arnauld continues and says:
Is it not clear that
since my present me
is necessarily of a certain individual nature,
which is the same thing as having a certain indivicual concept, it will be as impossible to conceive
of contradictory predicates in the individual
concept me, as to conceive of a me different from
me?
(OC pp. 94-95)
.

.

.

Transferring what Arnauld says about himself here to Adam, he seems
to be saying something like the following:

concept of Adam.

there is a unique complete

If there are several possible Adams,

there must be

at least two complete concepts of Adam which are distinct.

But, since

the complete concept of Adam is distinct from all other concepts,

there can not be two complete concepts of Adam.

case that there are several possible Adams.

Thus it is not the

Leibniz responds to

this objection by saying:

in speaking of several Adams I do not take
Adam for a determined individual but for a certain
person conceived sub ratione generalitatis under
the circumstances which appear to us to determine
Adam as an individual but which do not actually
.

.

.
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determine him sufficiently. As if we should mean
by Adam the first man, whom God set in a garden
of pleasure whence he went out because of sin,
and from whose side God fashioned a woman. All
this would not sufficiently determine him and
there might have been several Adams separately
possible or several individuals to whom that
would apply. This is true, whatever finite number
of predicates incapable of determining all the
rest might be taken, but that which determines
a certain Adam ought to involve absolutely all
his predicates, and it is this complete concept
which determines the particular individual.
(OC pp. 128-129)

Leibniz wants to label possible persons who are very similar to

Adam as possible Adams, but he does not want to claim that they are
in any sense the same Adam as the real Adam.

This becomes clear

when Leibniz says, "as if we should mean by Adam the first man, whom
God set in a garden of pleasure

.

.

.

there might have been several

Adams separately possible or several individuals to whom that would
apply," (OC p. 129).

Thus Leibniz is agreeing with Arnauld that

there is only one complete concept of Adam.

But there are other

complete concepts which are unrealized and which are very similar
to the concept of Adam in that they contain a number of the properties

that the concept of Adam contains.

They do not contain all and only

those properties that the concept of Adam contains, otherwise we would

be talking about a single concept rather than many concepts.

Leibniz

refers to these concepts which are similar to, but not identical with
the concept of Adam when he talks about "possible Adams".

Some contemporary terminology will now be introduced to avoid

continually using the phrase "possible persons very similar

to Adam".

Hereafter these possible persons will be referred to as "counterparts'
of Adam.

The use of such terminology is not completely unwarranted,
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given what Leibniz's position
seems to be.

One must keep in mind,

however, that "counterparts” as
used here does not mean exactly
the
same thing as used in contemporary
philosophy.
The expression "counter-

parts of Adam" will be used to refer
to those unrealized concepts

which are very similar to the concept
of Adam; the ones
appears Leibniz was referring.

to which it

Thus the counterpart relation in

the Leibnizian sense is a relation
between concepts

,

not individuals.

A more standard usage would have
the relation between individuals.
It seems that Leibniz,

for contingency.

through the use of counterparts, can allow

Before a more detailed account of the use
of counter-

parts by Leibniz in allowing for contingency
is given, however, we

will consider a more complete picture of the
problem facing Leibniz.
We will then suggest a way that counterparts
can solve the difficulties.
As suggested in the beginning of this section,
while Leibniz

claimed there are true contingent propositions it is not clear
that
he can consistently hold that view given his definition
of truth.

According to Leibniz, all true propositions are analytic.

That is,

the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate in

any true proposition.

The sentence, "Adam has blond hair", expresses

a true proposition provided that the concept associated with the name

Adam

(in some sense the "meaning" of the name Adam" includes the

concept associated with the predicate "has blond hair".

The propo-

sition that Adam has blond hair is analytic because its truth depends
solely on the concepts involved in the proposition.
Since all analytic propositions are necessary, it seems to follow
on Leibniz's view that all true propositions are necessary.

In order
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to consistently hold that there are
true contingent propositions,

Leibniz must either give up his definition
of truth, claim that it
does not follow from his definition of
truth that all true propo-

sitions are analytic, or claim that it is
not the case that all

analytic propositions are necessary.
to give up his definition of truth,

Leibniz clearly did not want
and given that definition of truth

there seems no way for him to deny that all true
propositions are

analytic.

But if Leibniz can consistently deny that all
analytic

propositions are necessary, then he can consistently hold
that there
are true contingent propositions.

However, it is unclear whether Leibniz

can consistently deny that all analytic propositions are
necessary.

Since complete individual concepts are sets of properties, they are

defined in extension, or by their members.
a set,

If one adds a member to

then one would have a different set, and if one takes a member

away from a set, then one would have a different set.

Because sets

are defined in extension, they necessarily have the members they have.
Since in order for a true proposition to be contingent it must be
possible, that the proposition not be true,

it seems as if there must

be a case such that the concept of the predicate is contained in the

concept of the subject, yet it is possible that the concept of the

predicate not be contained in the concept of the subject.
is not clear that this is possible,

can not change its members.

But it

since any particular concept

It would be possible if there were more

than one concept associated with the subject of a sentence, but Leibniz

clearly indicates that there may only be one.

Leibniz allows that where

the subject of the sentence refers to a substance, we can discuss subsets
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of the concept of the substance
(i.e., conceive of it sub ratione

g eneral itatis

).

there is only one complete concept
of the substance,

however, and that is the concept
which is associated with the subject
of a sentence which is about
the substance.

Thus, contrary to what

Leibniz says, it appears that there are
no true contingent propositions
Leibniz recognizes the difficulty in his
system yet still believes
that he can allow for contingency.

In his paper "On Freedom" he says:

I found myself very close
to the opinions of
those who hold everything to be absolutely
necessary; believing that when things are not
subject
to coercion, even though they are to
necessity,
there is freedom, and not distinguishing
between
the infallible, or what is known with
certainty
to be true, and the necessary.
But I was pulled back from this precipice
by considering those possible things which neither
are nor will be nor have been.
For, if certain
possible things never exist, existing things
cannot always be necessary; otherwise it would be
impossible for other things to exist in their
place, and whatever never exists would therefore
be impossible.
For it cannot be denied that many
stories, especially those we call novels, may
be regarded as possible, even if they do not actually take place in this particular sequence
of the universe which God has chosen.
(L pp. 404-405)

Here Leibniz suggests that there is contingency because there are
possible things which could have existed in the place of the things

which actually exist.

This becomes even clearer when he says:

Thus it is obvious that God elects from an infinity
of possible individuals those whom he judges best
suited to the supreme and secret ends of his wisdom.
In an exact sense, he does not decree that Peter
should sin or Judas be damned but only that, in
preference to other possible individuals, Peter,
who will sin certainly indeed, yet not necessarily
but freely and Judas, who will suffer damnation
under the same condition shall come into existence,
or that the possible concept shall become actual.

—

—

—

(L p.

414)
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Again Leibniz is saying that there
is contingency because God
could
have chosen to realize complete
concepts different from the ones
which in fact he chose to realize.

Thus while the concept of Peter

does contain the property of sinning,
as well as all the other prop-

erties that Peter has, God might have
realized a different concept in

place of the concept of Peter.

Here Leibniz is unclear about the

relationship between the concept of Peter
and these other "possible
concepts" (i.e., concepts that could have
been realized), but in
his discussion of Adam quoted earlier

6
,

Leibniz says it is one of simi-

larity.

He tells us that God chose Adam from among
possible persons

who are

very similar" to Adam.

But the most it seems we can conclude

from these passages is that the existence of Adam,
Peter, and Judas
is contingent,

contingent.

and not that the proposition that Peter will sin is

Yet Leibniz wants to say that the proposition that Peter

will sin is contingent as indicated when he says, "Peter, who will
sin

certainly indeed, yet not necessarily but freely."

Even if Peter's

existence is contingent, how is it that Peter's sinning is contingent,
since the property of sinning is included in the concept of Peter?

answer to this question seems to be contained in what Leibniz says
at the end of the Theodicy

,

his major work on freedom.

After discussing various objections to freedom and contingency
for Cod and individuals, Leibniz decides to present a dialogue.

says about it:
I thought it would be opportune to quote it in
abstract, retaining the dialogue form, and then
to continue from where it ends, keeping up the
fiction it initiated; and that less with the purpose of enlivening the subject, than in order to

He

The
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explain myself towards the end
of my dissertation
as clearly as I can, and in
a way most likely to
be generally understood.

^

^

365)

Leibniz continues with the story,
which deals with the fate of
Sextus,
in the following way:
Jupiter who loves you (she said
to him) has commended you to me to be instructed.
You see here
the palace of the fates, where
I keep watch and
ward.
Here are representations not only
of that
which happens but also of all that
which is possible.
Jupiter, having surveyed them before
the
beginning of the existing world, classified
the
possibilities into worlds, and chose the
best of
all ... I have only to speak, and
we shall see
a whole world that my father
might have produced
one may know also what would happen if
any
particular possibility should attain unto
existence
you can picture to yourself an ordered
succession of worlds, which shall contain each
and
every one the case that is in question,
and shall
vary its circumstances and its consequences.
But
if you put a case that differs from
the actual
world only in one single definite thing and in
its
results, a certain one of those determinate worlds
will answer you.
These worlds are all here, that
is, in ideas.
I will show you some, wherein shall
be found, not absolutely the same Sextus as
you
have seen (that is not possible, he carries with
him always that which he shall be) but several
Sextuses resembling him, possessing all that you
know already of the true Sextus, but not all that
is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence
all that shall yet happen to him. You will find
in one world a very happy and noble Sextus, in
another a Sextus content with a mediocre state,
a Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.
(t pp. 370-371)
•

.

.

•

.

Leibniz here suggests that it is possible that Sextus have a property
he lacks, such as being noble, because there is another Sextus in

another possible world which has the property of being noble.

Leibniz

points out that these various Sextuses in different possible worlds
are not identical to the real Sextus but resemble him closely, just
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as he pointed out that God chose
Ada* fro* a*ong possible persons

very similar to him but distinct
fro* hi*.

Considering what Leibniz

says here about Sextus and what
he says elsewhere about Ada*
and Peter,
the view he seems to present
is that Adam does not have
blond hair

necessarily because among an infinity
of complete concepts which closely
resemble the concept of Adam there is
one which lacks the property of
blond hair and which could have been
realized in place of the concept
of Adam.

In the case of Sextus, Leibniz says,
"You will find in one

world a very happy and noble Sextus, in
another a Sextus content with
a

mediocre state, a Sextus, indeed, of every
kind and endless diversity

of forms,"

(T p.

371).

We can expect to find in one world an Adam
with

blond hair, and in another world an Adam without
blond hair.

Since

these various Adams are not identical with Adam,
yet are very similar
to him,

it seems that Leibniz believes that they are
counterparts

of Adam.

As pointed out earlier,

7

the counterpart relation for Leibniz

is one which holds between concepts and not individuals,
as there are

only individuals in the real world.
-*-

s

Thus we can say that a true propo-

contingent just in case there is one counterpart of the

concept of the subject which contains the concept of the predicate
and one that does not.
The advantage of this view for Leibniz is great.

Leibniz can hold

that there is a complete concept of Adam which contains all the prop-

erties that Adam possesses.

Moreover, an atomic sentence about Adam

will be true just in case the concept of Adam contains the concept of
the predicate, and hence true propositions expressed by atomic sentences

about Adam are analytic.

Yet even though all such propositions are
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analytic, they are not all necessary.

Thus, Leibniz can allow for

contingency even though all true
propositions expressed by atomic
sentences are analytic.
Leibniz never explicitly states
that a sentence
is possible because one
concept has a property that a counterpart
of
it lacks.

But given what he does say, this
view seems strongly suggested

If we accept this view for
Leibniz,

there remains a puzzle as

hat Leibniz is doing when it
appears he analyzes necessity and

contingency not in terms of counterparts
and possible worlds, but in
terms of infinite and finite analysis.

If we are to give a complete

picture of Leibniz we must be able to give
some account of infinite
and finite analysis as they relate to
necessity.

Both Rescher and

Parkinson claim that Leibniz introduces these
notions, in part, to
explain how analytic propositions can be contingent,
and Leibniz sometimes speaks as if he is doing this

8
.

But if he can allow for contin-

gency through the use of counterparts and possible worlds,
there seems
little point in introducing further complexity in the
notion of an

infinite analysis.

The key to the solution of the puzzle is that the

problem for Leibniz, given his definition of truth, is really two-fold.
xf every true proposition is analytic,

then not only does it

seem to follow that every true proposition is necessary, it also seems
to follow that every true proposition is knowable

a_

pri ori

.

A propo-

sition expressed by a sentence is knowable a priori just in case the
truth of the proposition can be known by understanding the meanings
of the terms in the sentence (i.e.,

the concepts associated with the

terms) and the logical structure of the sentence.

"Every man is an animal".

Consider the sentence,

We can know the truth of the proposition

90

expressed by this sentence by knowing
what 'man' means and knowing
what 'animal' means, and by
understanding the logical structure
of
the sentence.

In this case the logical
structure of the sentence is

the form, "Every

is

We understand this structure
when

we recognize the form and know
the truth conditions for sentences
of
that form.

We know that included in the concept
of man is the concept

of animal, and that the proposition
expressed by the sentence asserts
this.

Thus we know a priori that every man
is an animal.

On Leibniz's

view, everx true proposition is such
that the concept of the predicate
is included in the concept of the
subject.

But if Leibniz is correct,

then it seems that every true proposition
is knowable a priori

m

,

since

order to know the truth of a proposition we
need only know the con-

cepts involved in the proposition.

Consider the proposition expressed

by the sentence, "Adam has blond hair."

On an intuitive level this

proposition does not seem to be knowable a priori

It would seem that

.

we would need to know more than just the meanings of
the terms in
the sentence and the structure of the sentence in order
to know the

truth of the proposition.

Perhaps we might see Adam and note the color

of his hair, or we might obtain some authoritative documents
indicating

that he has blond hair.

In any case it would appear that we need some

additional evidence in order to know that Adam has blond hair.
on Leibniz

s

But

view it seems we know that Adam has blond hair just by

understanding the meanings of the terms in the sentence, "Adam has
blond hair", since the concept of Adam includes the concept of blond
hair.

Leibniz's response to this problem is that while all true propo-

sitions are in principle knowable

a_

priori

,

we (i.e.

,

human beings)
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will never know all true propositions
a priori because „e lack
certain
powers
Leibniz says he holds two primary
truths— the principle of contradiction, and:
"The principle that nothing is
without reason, or that
every truth has its proof a priori

,

drawn from the meaning of the

terms, although we have not always
the power to attain this analysis,"
(OC p.

141).

But if every truth is in principle
knowable a priori

how is it that humans can not know
all truths a priori ?

,

The answer

to this question is found in the
notion of an infinite analysis.

Leibniz

says
In contingent truths, however, though
the predicate inheres in the subject, we can never
demonstrate
this, nor can the propositions ever be reduced
to an equation or an identity, but the
analysis
proceeds to infinity, only God being able to see,
not the end of analysis indeed, since there
is no
end, but the nexus of terms or the inclusion of
the predicate in the subject, since he sees everything which is in the series.
For us, however, there remain two ways of knowcontingent
truths.
The one is experience; the
J-.Hg
other, reason.
We know by experience when we perceive a thing distinctly enough by our senses; by
reason, however, when we use the general principle
that nothing happens without a reason, or that the
pi edicate always inheres in the subject by virtue
of some reason.
(L pp. 407-408; emphasis added)
.

.

Leibniz claims that while contingent truths are indeed analytic, we
can not demonstrate their truth, since such a demonstration or analysis

would have to be an infinite one, hence we can not know them

a

priori

.

God, on the other hand, while unable to complete the analysis (since
it can not be completed)

can none the less see that the concept of the

predicate is included in the concept of the subject.
truths by experience,

We know contingent

though reason does tell us the truth conditions
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for propositions in general.
It

seems that Leibniz introduces the
notion of an infinite analysis

to explain why humans can not
know all analytic propositions a
priori
In fact, as we would expect,

.

the truths which we can not know a
priori

are the contingent truths:
And there is no truth of fact or of
individual
things which does not depend upon an
infinite series
of reasons, though God alone can
see everything
that is in this series.
This is the cause, too,
why only God knows the contingent truths
a priori
and sees their infallibility otherwise
than by
experience.
(L p
406 )
.

Using the idea of an infinite analysis Leibniz
attempts to explain why
we do not know all analytic propositions

a_

priori

.

The problem with

this explanation is that Leibniz explains one
puzzling fact by some-

thing which is even more puzzling, namely an infinite
analysis.

We

have already considered the Rescher and Parkinson accounts
of the

nature of infinite analysis, but Leibniz himself gives some hints
for understanding this notion which seem worth considering at this
point.
In explaining the notion of an infinite analysis Leibniz often

makes use of mathematical concepts.

He says:

But in proportions the analysis may sometimes be
completed, so that we arrive at a common measure
which is contained in both terms of the proportion
an integral number of times, while sometimes the
analysis can be continued into infinity, as when
comparing a rational number with a surd; for instance,
the side of a square with a diagonal.
(L p. 407)

Leibniz wants to make some sort of analogy between the relation between
rational numbers to irrational and the relation between infinite and
finite analysis.

Rational numbers can be expressed by a ratio between

two integers, for example 15 can be expressed by 1/2, and .333... by 1/3.
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But irrationals cannot be expressed
by a ratio between two integers,
and have a non-repeating decimal
expansion, such as tt which is
3.1415
and so on.
Thus in some sense irrationals are
an infinite series of

integers
7T

,

while rationals are not.

Leibniz wants to say that just as

takes an infinite analysis (in
some sense), so do truths not knowable

a priori.

However, while one can make some sense
of the notion of

infinite analysis in mathematics, it
is difficult to see how that is
to carry over into talk about
propositions.

An example of a finite

analysis will be helpful in understanding
the problem.
Suppose we are given that John is a brother
and we want to know

whether John is male.

Leibniz tells us that analyses are carried on

by substituting for terms their definitions.

means
for

male and a sibling".
brother

a sibling".

We know that "brother"

We therefore substitute "male and a sibling"

in our original sentence, and conclude "John is
male and

From this we can conclude that "John is male", and we have

shown in a finite analysis that from the fact that John is a
brother
it follows that John is male.

So far it all makes good sense.

However,

when we try to apply the same idea to the notion of infinite analysis
we encounter some problems.

Of course we cannot give an example of

an infinite analysis, but even the idea of one seems beyond conception.

Consider a contingent truth,

(say),

"Adam has blond hair."

We know

that the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the

subject (if the sentence is true, and we are supposing it is), but
in order to demonstrate the inclusion, an infinite analysis is required.
It seems obvious that by substituting the definition of "blond hair"

in the original sentence we get nowhere, thus it must be that we should
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substitute the definition of "Adam” in order
to start the analysis.

By

the definition of "Adam" Leibniz
means the complete concept of Adam,

which, as discussed earlier, is to be
thought of as a set of properties
Thus, what we are trying to demonstrate
is that the property of having

blond hair is a member of the set of
properties which constitutes the

complete concept of Adam.

For simplicity, let us call the complete

concept of Adam "A", and the property of having
blond hair "b".

we are trying to show is whether b is a member
of A.

What

A has an infinite

number of members, so we might say that in order
to show that b is
a member of A we would have to list all the
members of A, which would

be infinite.

Thus, to demonstrate that Adam has blond hair requires

an infinite analysis, in that it would require a list of
all of A*s

members, which would be infinite.

However, there is a slight problem

in taking this to be what Leibniz means by infinite analysis,
and that
is even though it may be true that for any given property we can
not

decide if it is a member of A or not, if it is a member it will occur
on the list which is infinite.
If A is a listable set,

then one can construct a machine (say)

M such that M will continuously create
x if x is a member of A,

a list of outputs and for any

then x will be output at some time.

The point

is that even if A is an infinite set and thus we could not list all

the members, any particular member of A will occur on the list at

some time.

It does not follow from this that for any given property

we can decide whether it is a member or not, since at any given time
if it has not appeared on the list we do not know that it will not

appear on the list.

If A is listable then it does not appear that
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it would take infinite analysis
to show that b is a member of
A.

M will

start listing the members of A and
since b is a member of A, b will

occur on the list at some time; when
b occurs on the list, only a
finite

number of members will have occurred
before it.

It is as if we had a

machine programmed to list all the natural
numbers in order:

the machine

will never complete the list, yet for
any particular number chosen, the

machine will list it in a finite number of
outputs.
of concepts

(i.e.,

Given this view

that they are listable sets), all contingent
truths

expressible by atomic sentences are knowable

a.

priori

.

One might avoid this problem if one takes a
different view of

what it would be like to attempt to list the members
of

A.

It was

suggested that it would be like having a machine trying to
list all
the positive integers.

But, one might suggest it is more like having

a machine list in order all the reals between one
and four inclusive.

In this case,

the list would amount to a single number, namely one.

It

would never be able to list any number after one, since between one
and any number after one there are an infinite number of numbers.

way of viewing infinite analysis has a number of advantages.

This

We can

explain, in a sense, why it is that we could never demonstrate that b
is a member of A.

Doing that would be the same as the machine producing

the first real number after one; obviously it cannot be done.

The case

of demonstrating necessary truths would be like the machine producing

one on its list.

But it has a major disadvantage in that it is hard

to see how the relation among the members of Adam's complete concept

could be anything like the relation among the reals.

That is, it is

hard to see how the complete concept of Adam could have the property
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of "betweenness" as the reals have
the property of betweenness.

Either

way of viewing infinite analysis has
its problems.
For our purposes it is not really
necessary to solve the problem
of defining an infinite analysis,

m

presenting

a

though it certainly would be helpful

complete account of Leibniz.

present a clear account of infinite analysis,

Even though we cannot
an interpretation of

Leibniz explaining why he introduces both
possible worlds and counterparts, and finite and infinite analysis, can
be suggested.

A propo-

sition may be knowable a priori (by us) for Leibniz
just in case the
truth of the proposition can be demonstrated by
us in a finite analysis.

A proposition is said to be necessary just in case
all the counterparts
of the concept of the subject (of a sentence which
expresses the propo-

sition) include the concept of the predicate.

Using these two notions

we can see how Leibniz might avoid the difficulties suggested
earlier.

While it is true that every true proposition is analytic, i.e., the
concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject, it
does not follow that they are either all necessary or that we can know
them

a_

priori

suppose it is true.

Consider the sentence, "Adam has blond hair", and

.

If it is true,

in the concept of Adam.

the concept of blond hair is included

But in order for it to be necessarily true

we must further suppose that all the counterparts of the concept of

Adam also include the concept of blond hair.
clearly unwarranted.

know

a_

Such a supposition is

Moreover, in order for us to claim that we can

prior i that Adam has blond hair, we must suppose that we can

show that the concept of blond hair is included in the concept of Adam
in a finite analysis.

Again, this is a supposition which Leibniz would
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claim is unwarranted.

Thus, for Leibniz the fact that a
proposition

is analytic does not imply either
that it is necessary or that we can

know it

£

priori .

One of the difficulties in suggesting this
account of necessity
and contingency for Leibniz is its apparent
lack of precision.

Can

we make this account more precise using
contemporary logical techniques?
In other words,

can we present a semantics for a formal language
as

Mates does which avoids the difficulties of Mates'
system, has the
same good points as Mates' system, yet at the same
time incorporates
in a more precise way the account of necessity and
contingency presented

above?

In the next chapter a semantics will be presented
which meets

all of these conditions.
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In the preceding chapter it was
suggested that Leibniz analyzes

truth, necessity and contingency in
terms of complete individual con-

cepts, possible worlds, and counterparts.

Leibniz, of course, does

not present a complete semantics in
the sense that he does not provide
us with a recursive definition of
truth for all formulas of a given

formal language.

The task at hand is to present a complete
semantics

for predicate logic plus the modalities in
question, which incorporates
the account suggested for Leibniz in Chapter
IV.
In a paper called "Counterpart Theory and
Quantified Modal Logic",

David Lewis has suggested a different approach to viewing
modal logic,

which he calls Counterpart Theory

.

Given that Leibniz also used the

notion of counterparts, Lewis' paper suggests a good approach to a

Leibnizian semantics.

Lewis does not present a semantics in his paper,

but rather provides us with a translation scheme.

He presents a way

of translating sentences in quantified modal logic to sentences in

his Counterpart Theory.

We understand the sentences in Counterpart

Theory by a number of postulates that Lewis gives as well as by their
English readings.

Lewis was not trying to account for Leibniz when

he formulated this theory, and there are certain Leibnizian ideas not

included in Lewis' Counterpart Theory.

We now propose to present a

counterpart semantics based to a great extent on Lewis' Counterpart
Theory but including Leibniz's ideas.
First we need some definitions, postulates, and axioms.*
is a set of properties.

A concept

A complete individual concept (cic) is a set
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of properties sueh that it is possible
that there is one object which

has all and only those properties in
the set.

Postulates
i)

A set K is compossible if and only if K
is a non-empty
set of cic's, and it is possible that for
any X, if

X
ii)

then X is realized.

K,

A set K is maximal if and only if for any cic
X, if
X

iii)

e

^

then kU{x} is not compossible.

K,

A set W is a possible world if and only if W is
maximal
and W is compossible.

iv)

A cic C reflects a cic D only if it is not possible
that C is realized and D is not realized.

v)

A cic

C

mirrors a possible world W if and only if for

any cic D, if D
vi)

e

W,

then C reflects D.

A set K involves a cic C if and only if K is a non-empty
set of cic's and it is not possible that for any X, if

X
vii)

e

K then X is realized, and C is not realized.

A set K is closed if and only if K is a non-empty set
of cic's and for any cic C, if K involves C then C is
a member of K.

3

Axiom s
I.

II.

Every cic is a member of some possible world.
For any possible world W and for any cic C, if C is a

member of W then C mirrors

W.
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Theorems
Thl

Every possible world is closed.

:

Proof

Assume:

(1)

There is a possible world W such that W
is not closed.

(

2)

There is a cic C, such that W involves
C

(3)

and C

i

e W,

then X is realized, and C is not

realized.
4)

(5)

(

6)

(Postulate vii)

It is not possible that for all X, if

X

(

W.

And C

i W.

(Postulate vi)

W is maximal.
W

U

(Postulate iii)

(C) is not compossible.

It is not possible that for all X,

X

e W,

((3),

8)

((5)

and Postulate i)

It is necessary that for all X if X e W

(From (3))

It is necessary that for all X, if

X

e

W,

then X is realized only if C is

not realized.
(9)

Postulate ii)

then X is realized and C is

then X is realized only if C is realized.
(

&

if

realized.
(7)

(4)

(From (6))

It is not possible that for all X,

X

e

W,

if

then X is realized.

(From (7) and (8))

W is not compossible.

((9)

(ID

W is compossible.

(Postulate iii)

12 )

(10) contradicts

(

(

10 )

(11), thus W is closed.

Q.

E.

and Postulate i)

D.
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Th2:

Every cic is a member of one possible
world.
By Axiom

every cic is a member of some world

I

,

so we will

show that every cic is a member of only
one possible world.
Assume:

(2)
(1)

There is a cic C such that CeW and CeW^,
and W and W" are possible worlds and W^W'.

There is a cic D, D
D ^ W and D

c

e

W and D

£

W' (or

but since the proof is

the same in either case we assume D

and D

t

W^)

e

W

•

((1)

&

Postulate iii)

(3)

C

mirrors W.

((1) and Axiom II)

(4)

C

reflects D.

((2),

(5)

It is not possible C is realized and

D is not realized.
(6)

(7)
(8)

\J'

((4)

&

Postulate v)

and Postulate iv)

is closed.

(Thl)

does not involve D.

(Assume)

It is possible that for any X, if XeW^,

then X is realized and D is not realized.
(9)

(3)

It is possible that if C

e

W",

((7)

&

Postulate vi)

then

C is realized;

(10)

and D is not realized.

(11)

It is possible that C is realized and

D is not realized.
(12)
(13)

(11) contradicts

D e W".

(15)

(14) contradicts

(From (10),

(1))

(5), hence

does involve D.

(14)

(From (8))

(From (7) through (11))
(From (13),

(2).

Q.

E.

D.

(6),

Post vii)
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Thus the axioms and postulates imply
that a concept is a member of
only
one world, which is what we suggested
Leibniz holds in Chapter III.

These axioms and postulates give us a
rather precise conceptual frame-

work to use in developing a more formal
account of the suggestion
presented in the preceding chapter.
The remaining notion to be clarified, and
in some ways the most

difficult, is the notion of counterparts.

Lewis describes counter-

parts as follows:

Your counterparts resemble you closely in content
and context in important respects.
They resemble
you more closely than do the other things in their
worlds.
But they are not really you.
For each of
them is in his own world, and only you are here in
the actual world.
Indeed we might say, speaking
casually, that your counterparts are you in other
worlds, that they and you are the same; but this
sameness is no more a literal identity than the
sameness between you today and you tomorrow.
It
would be better to say that your counterparts are
men you would have been had the world been otherwise.
,

(Lewis pp.

114-115)

In describing counterparts as he does, Lewis views the counterpart

relation to be one among possible objects, rather than a relation
among complete individual concepts.

Both Lewis and Leibniz indicate

that counterparts are things which resemble or are very similar to

each other in important respects.

However the degree of similarity

needed in order to make two things counterparts, or what the important
respects are in which they must be similar in order to be counterparts is never clearly defined by either Lewis or Leibniz.

Leibniz says, "in speaking of several Adams

I

do not take Adam

for a determined individual but for a certain person conceived sub

ratione generalitatis under the circumstances which appear to us to
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determine Adam as an individual but which
do not actually
sufficiently," (OC 129; emphasis added).

determine

In talking about several

Sextuses he says, "several Sextuses resembling
him, possessing all
that jou know already of the true Sextus,
but not all that is already

in him imperceptibly," (T p.

371;

emphasis added).

These two quotes

from Leibniz suggest that Leibniz thought
the counterpart relation
to be somehow a function or a measure of our
knowledge of the subject.

In the quote about Sextus, Leibniz indicates
that in order for some-

thing to be a counterpart of Sextus it must have at
least all the

properties that Sextus is known to have.

But Leibniz is very unclear

here, and we should not take him too literally.

After all, not all

people would know exactly the same truths about Sextus, and it seems

un^^it to attribute to Leibniz the view that the counterparts of
Sextus would vary depending on who is talking about Sextus and what
he knows about Sextus.

For that matter, it seems unfair to attribute

to Leibniz the view that the counterparts of Sextus vary as more is

known (by anyone) about Sextus.

We might say that the counterparts

of the concept of Sextus are those concepts which contain at least

all of Sextus' "essential properties".

The problem with this idea is that an essential property is

usually defined as a property that an object has in all possible
worlds.

But in a system such as the one being envisioned, an object

exists in only one world, so either the object has no essential properties or all of its properties are essential, depending on whether
or not one allows it to have properties in worlds in which it does

not exist.

In either case this notion of essential properties will
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not be of much help.

However, keeping in mind that it appears
that

Leibniz wants some connection between knowledge
and counterparts, there

may be a way of defining essential
properties which will be of some
help in clarifying the notion of counterparts.
We could define essential properties in
terms of our a priori

knowledge.

That is, we could define essential property as
follows:

A property F is essential to a cic X iff humans can
know
a_

priori that X includes F.

Thus, for example,

the property of being human is essential to the

concept of Adam just in case we can know

a.

priori that the concept

of Adam includes the property of being human (i.e., we
can know a

priori that Adam is human)

.

The problem in defining "essential property"

this way is that, as noted in Chapter IV,

Leibniz of

the account suggested for

priori knowledge is itself less than crystal clear.

was suggested that one can know

a_

It

priori a proposition just in case

the truth of the proposition can be demonstrated in a finite analysis.

But exactly what a finite or infinite analysis is was left in murky

waters which we will not now attempt to cross.

For all the lack of

clarity in the above definition of essential properties, it will help
us to define the counterpart relation.

DF1:

The concept A is a counterpart of the concept B if and only
if A contains all the properties which are essential to B.

The most we can get from these definitions of "essential property"

and "counterpart" is an intuitive idea of what the counterpart relation
is, not a precise notion of it.

Moreover, DFl is not the only plausible

way of defining the counterpart relation given that we have a definition
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of essential property.

But before we consider some alternatives
to

DF1, we will first put to use what we
have done and present a counter-

part semantics for Leibniz.

This will make the consequences of alter-

native definitions of counterparts more readily
apparent.
The individual constants will be a

variables x^, x^, x^
one (except identity)

.

•

,

a

,

a

.

.

.

,

the individual

3

the predicate letters will be all of rank

•,

F^

12

F^, F

.

.

.,

and the normal logical signs

3
'

'

,

v'

and 'O'.

We will say a formula

<J>

is well-formed iff either $ is a predicate

letter followed by a constant, i.e., F^ (aj or a predicate
letter followed by a variable, i.e., F^(x^) or an identity sign flanked
by constants
or variables, i.e., a

= a., x
J

1

= x.,
J

or a. = x., or if $ is well-formed,
1

3

then:
is well-formed

(i)

v

(ii)

(iii)

^

(x)

^D$''

(iv)

(where

1

ijj'

$'*

ip

is well-formed) is well-formed

is well-formed

is well-formed

A sentence is a closed well-formed formula.
An interpretation is an ordered 6-tuple, <D, G,
(1)

D = the set of all cic's ^

(2)

C(D) = the set of possible worlds

(3)

G = the set of properties

(4)

f

is a function such that:

(i)

f

is from the set of constants onto D

(ii)

f

is from the set of predicates onto G

C,

V,

f,

K> where:
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K is the counterpart relation such that:

(5)

(i)

(ii)

(a) (a e D

Ka a

->

(a) (6) [kaB

)

(EWJ

->

(W

C(D)~ a

e

W

e

)

±

(EW.)(H.
1

C(D),

£

g

W

£

1

)1
j

V is a valuation function such that for any sentence
$,

(6)

possible world VL, wffs

constants a, and
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

,

variable y, predicate R and

x,

8

If $ is Ra,

then V($, W

)

= T iff f(R)

e

f(a)

Ms

then V($, W

)

= T iff V (^

W

)

If $ is
If

$>

is

If $ is

,

^ T

v x, then V($, W ) = T iff either
±

ip

or V(x, W
(iv)

ip

±

W

V(\p,

±

= T

)

= T

)

then V($, VL) = T iff V

(y)ijj,

[i^

(y/a)

,

w]

= T

for all a such that f(a) in W^.
(v)

(vi)

If $ is a = 6,
If
a

\p

±

= T iff f(a) is f(6)

)

is such that it contains n distinct constants

...
1

then V($, W

and no others and

a

n

$

isQf,

then

V($, W.) = T iff
l

11

(W.)(B

)

...

){K F (a

(6

n

v|>( a l/3

...

a

$ is

a necessary truth iff

)

n/B

)

n

1

A sentence

ii

Q

$ is

f(8

)

...

K f(a
n

)

f(B

)

-*

n

W ] = T}

f

true in some world.

A sentence $ is analytic iff $ is true in all possible worlds.^
In the system presented there are possible worlds which are

made up of complete individual concepts.

Due to the way possible

worlds are defined, no particular cic is in more than one world.

In

agreement with Leibniz and Mates, truth is defined intensionally,
that is, a sentence is true provided that the concept of the predicate
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is included in the concept of
the subject.

If we symbolize the sentence

"Adam is the first man,” as Fa, then
Fa will be true relative to a
given world, provided that the concept
associated with the predicate
F

(i.e., f (F)

a.

(i.e., f(a)).

is a member of the concept associated
with the constant

In this case, presumably, f(F) is a
member of f(a).

An atomic sentence,

(say) Fa, will be necessary just in case
all

the counterparts of the concept of a
contain the concept of F.

An

atomic sentence is contingent provided that
it is not necessary, yet
it is possible.

The necessity of sentences, other than atomic
ones,

is slightly more complicated, unless there
are no constants in the

sentence.

Any sentence which does not contain a constant will
be

necessary just in case the sentence is true in all worlds,
and it

will be contingent provided it is true in one world, but
not all.
For example, consider the sentence (x)Fx.

sary provided it is true of all worlds.

This sentence will be necesIn order for (x)Fx to be

true of any world, all the complete individual concepts of that world

must contain the concept of F.

If

(x)Fx is necessary, then every

complete individual concept contains the concept of
sentence,

F.

A complex

(say) Fa^ v Fa^, •will be necessary just in case in every

world either the counterparts of the concept of a or the counterparts
of the concept of a^ contain the concept of F.

for Leibniz,

Thus, as

I

suggested

the necessity of a sentence depends upon what properties

the counterparts of the concept of the subject contain (at least in

those cases where the concept of the subject is a complete individual

concept)
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In the semantics presented, we have a way
to distinguish between

analytic and necessary propositions.
are necessary.

Not all analytic propositions

Consider the sentence, "Adam has blond hair," and sup

pose that it is true.

We can symbolize the sentence as Ba.

Ba is

analytic because in every world f(B) is a member of f(a), even
though
f(a) is only a member of one world.

It is not necessary because

presumably, f(B) will not be a member of all the counterparts of

f (a)

.

An alternative to (6)(vi) is:
is such that it contains n distinct constants a

If

(J)

.

a

.

1

and no others and $ is
V($, W
1

K

f (a

= T iff

)

(W.)(B
J

11
)

f(3

)

...

O

JKf(a

)

ip,

then

...

(B

1

nn
)

n

f(3 ))

n

){(f(B

-*

)

e

vJjKV^
i

W

....f(S

-.-“n/B

1

e

)

n

j

1

j

W

nj),

W

1

= T>

J

One might think that (J) is a more natural account of necessity than
(6) (vi)

because

(J)

requires that the counterparts being considered

be in those worlds where the sentence is being evaluated.

consider the sentence DFa.

For example,

According to (J), q Fa is true in W

just
i

in case in every world where f(a) has some counterpart f(3), FB is

When determining the necessity of atomic sentences,

true in that world.
(J)

and (6) (vi) will yield the same results.

(J)

and (6)(vi) appears when we consider molecular sentences.

the sentence Fa
to (6) (vi)

,

„

Fb

.

In order for Fa

„

The difference between

Consider

Fb to be necessary according

all of the counterparts of f(a) and all of the counter-

parts of f(b) must contain f(F).

But according to (J), Fa

^

Fb will

be necessary just in case those counterparts of f(a) and f(b) which
are members of the same world contain f(F).

parts of f(a) and f(b) share a world, then Fa

If none of the counter„

Fb is necessary.

Thus,

Ill

it could turn out on (J)

sary, but Fa

a

that Fa is not necessary and Fb is not neces-

Fb is necessary.

This is clearly an unacceptable result

and thus for this reason the system presented contains (6) (vi) rather

than (J).^
In the system presented it is possible that a concept C has two

counterparts in some world and it is possible that C be the counterpart of two concepts in a world.

part Theory
Leibniz.

,

This is also true of Lewis' Counter-

and led Mates to object to a counterpart semantics for

Mates discusses the idea of counterparts relative to Lewis'

Counterpart Theory

,

and says:

As presented by Lewis, the counterpart relation,
though always reflexive, need not be symmetric
or transitive.
Further, it is possible for two
or more different things in a given world to be
counterparts of a single thing in another world,
and it is possible for a single thing in a given
world to be a common counterpart of two or more
things in another world.
These features would block
Leibniz from agreeing that 'your counterparts are
men you would have been , had the world been otherwise.'
For example, he could not agree that there
are conceivable conditions under which you would
have been Aj and you would have been A ? but A^
His theory of identity
would not have been A 2
requires it to be a necessary truth that, given
any two individuals, at most one of them is you.
•

(M2 p.

Ill)

From the above, Mates seems to conclude certain things about the nature
of the counterpart relation for Leibniz.

He says, "Let us agree further

with Leibniz that the counterpart relation, whatever other properties
it has, must be symmetric and transitive, and also that nothing is a

counterpart of anything else in its own world," (M2 pp. 112-113).

Then,

using what he calls Leibniz's "principle of continuity" he presents

what appears to be his strongest argument against the use of counter-
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parts for Leibniz.

He says:

all that is needed for our purposes in the
claim that any two concepts from different worlds
can be joined by a discrete series of intermediate
concepts (from distinct worlds) in which each concept
is enough like its predecessor to qualify as a
counterpart of it. Then, by the symmetry and transitivity of the counterpart relation, we would have
the absurd consequence that every concept in every
world would be a counterpart of every other concept
in any other world.
(M2 p. 115)
.

.

.

Mates' argument against counterparts basically rests on three points:
one, an unusual reading of Leibniz's Law of Continuity, which for our

purposes we will accept; two, that the counterpart relation is totally
defined in terms of similarity; and, three, that the counterpart re-

lation is symmetric and transitive.

The last two points are intimately

connected in that if either one is lacking the argument will not
work.

In the system presented, neither one of them holds.

Mates argues that the counterpart relation must be symmetric and

transitive for Leibniz as well as that nothing can have a counterpart
in its own world besides itself.

The reason the counterpart relation

must be restricted in this way is that if it is not, then we get certain

unintuitive results viewed from a Leibnizian perspective.

Mates says

that Leibniz would not agree that (say) Adam had two counterparts in
the same world.

Mates might be right in saying that Leibniz would not

like something to have two counterparts in the same world, but his remedy
to the problem seems a bit extreme given that he is taking the counter-

part relation to be defined totally in terms of similarity.

Mates

suggests we make the counterpart relation transitive and symmetric
and add the following restriction (which is put in terms of the semantics

presented above)
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(Cl)

(W

)

(a)

{

(w

J

e

C (D)

-

a e W.)

J

+ (B)(B

e w.

3

-

j

[

K ga

->

6

=.a|)}

While doing what Mates suggests does in fact get us the
results Mates
wants, it makes any counterpart system based on similarity
unintuitive

from any point of view, whether it be Leibniz's or not.

How does one

handle the problem Mates points out if not in terms of transitivity
and symmetry?
(C2)

The answer is simply to add the following two conditions:

(W.) (W.) (a) (B)(5){ (W.
i

BeW -6eW.)->
J

(C 3 )

(W.

)

)

-

e

W

C(D)
*

and

(C2),

[(KaB

(C3)

a e

W

A

6’]}

-

1

-

e

C(D)

A

a

e

Ka6)

-*

W
i

3

3

= 6]}

together insure that if A is a member

of W. and if A has a counterpart in
.

A

i

K6a) -*3 =

i

6eW)->

Conditions (Cl),

J

C(D)

3

[(KBa

(a) (8) (6){ (W

3

BeW

W-

-We

C(D)

J

(W

1

e

i

J

,

A has only one counterpart in

They also insure that if A is a member of W

and A is a counteri

part to something in
that thing in W_.

W_.

,

then A is the only counterpart (in

W_^)

to

And, they insure that if a concept is a member of

any world, then in that world it is its only counterpart.

But the

conditions do not imply that the counterpart relation is either transitive or symmetric.

Thus, conditions (Cl),

(C2) and

(C3) get the

results we want without, it seems, any bad side effects.

Moreover, no

matter how one defines counterparts, it seems that principles (Cl),
(C2) and

(C3) should hold in a Leibnizian counterpart system.

Thus

we shall add them to the original system presented under part (5).

As

far as Mates' objection goes, even if we define the counterpart relation

totally in terms of similarity, there is no reason to make the relation

transitive and symmetric for Leibniz, provided we add conditions like
(Cl),

(C2) and

(C3)

to the system.

Moreover, even if we did not add
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(Cl),

and (C3) to the system, Mates' objection would
not apply

(C 2 )

to it.

Mates

objection does not hold against the system presented above

because counterparts are not defined totally in terms of similarity.
It will not be true that,

"any two concepts from different worlds

can be joined by a discrete series of intermediate concepts (from

worlds) in which each concept is enough like its predecessor
to qualify as a counterpart of it,"

(M2 p.

The reason it is

115).

not true is that if we start with two concepts which do not have the

same essential properties, there could never be a series between them
in which each concept is enough like its predecessor to count as a

counterpart of it.

All members of the series would have to have the

same essential properties, yet by hypothesis the first and the last

member do not have the same essential properties.

Thus, Mates’ objec-

tion does not hold against the system being proposed.

Moreover, it

does not really work against Lewis, since by adding something like (Cl),
(C2), and

(C3) Lewis could avoid it.

There is a slight problem in adding (Cl),

system presented above.

(C2)

and (C3) to the

Suppose there is a concept C in a world VL

such that in world W. there are two concepts which contain all the

properties essential to

C.

According to (C2)

,

C can

have at most

one counterpart in world W., yet it appears that on DFl C has two

counterparts in W,.

The problem Is, which one of the two concepts

which qualify as counterparts under DFl is the counterpart of

in W
j

C?

We might change the definition of counterparts to avoid this

difficulty.
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As mentioned earlier, DF1 is not the only way
to define the counter

part relation given a definition of essential property.

There are at

least two other ways of defining it which are worth
comparing to DF1.
DF2:

The concept A is a counterpart of the concept

B

if and only

if all the properties which are essential to B are
essential
to A.

DF3:

The concept A is a counterpart of the concept B if and only
if the properties which are essential to A and the properties

which are essential to B are exactly the same properties.

According to DF1

,

the counterpart relation is reflexive, but not

transitive or symmetrical.

Under DF2, on the other hand, the relation

is reflexive and transitive, but not symmetrical, while under DF3

the relation is reflexive, transitive and symmetrical.

We can easily

incorporate either DF2 or DF3 into the system presented above by
adding the following conditions under part
(for DF2) (iii)

(for DF3)

(iv)

(a) (3) (6)

(Kag

,,

|

(a) (8) (Kag

->

Kg6)

(5)
->

KaS]

Kga)

In order to incorporate DF3 we would add both (iii) and (iv)

Depending on how one defines the counterpart relation, the results
of the system will vary.

For example,

DFl, but would be under DF2 or DF3. <>$

Q$ +DO

$

is not a result under

is not a result under

DFl or DF2, but would be if we defined counterpart by DF3.

DF3, the strongest of the three definitions, seems to be the most

likely candidate for resolving the problem created by adding (Cl), (C2)
and (C3) to the system.

But on DF3 the difficulty is still there.

is possible that there are two concepts, A and B,

in world W^ which

It
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have the same essential properties that C has in world W..

In fact,

in this case A and B will be counterparts to each other
according to
DF3.

Intuitively, A in world W
1

is a counterpart of B in world W

just in case A resembles B more than anything else in W,.

j’

But we

do not want the counterpart relation defined totally in terms of

similarity relative to worlds, otherwise it could turn out that the
concept of a particular tree be a counterpart to the concept of Adam.
Perhaps what is needed is a definition of counterpart which combines
the ideas of essentiality and similarity for counterparts.
If A and B are both concepts,

then 'P (A)' will be the number
B

of properties that A and B share.

DF4:

Thus, P (A) = P A (B).
D

A.

A concept A is a counterpart of a concept B if and only if
(i)

(ii)

A and B have the same essential properties, and
There is a possible world hh and
Wj
P

B

such that A £ H. and B
(A)

-*•

P

(x)

and (x)

e

(x^B

W_.

.

,

a

possible world

and (x) [(x^A

x e W

)

-*

P

fi

A

~

(B)

x

Vh)

e

> P

A

>

(x)|.

In order to incorporate DF4 into the present system we would add (iv)

(mentioned in connection with DF3 above) under part (5).

DF4 allows

only one counterpart per concept per world, which is what is insured
by (Cl),

(C2) and

(C3).

DF4 has a slight disadvantage in that in order

for A to be a counterpart of B, B must be a counterpart of A.

other words, DF4 makes the counterpart relation symmetrical.

In

This

may seem counterintuitive, given that the counterpart relation is
defined, in part, in terms of similarity.

We can avoid this problem

by altering the definition to the following:
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DF5:

A concept A is

a

counterpart of a concept B if and only if

A and B have the same essential properties, and

(i)

There is a possible world

(ii)

such that A
P

(A)
b

>

P

and B

e

(x)]

,

e

and a possible world W

W

,

and (x)

and (x)(y){(x^B

j

„

fi

[Px(A) > Px(y)]

(XM

x e W

„

yM-xeW.

-

±

-*

)

yeW^

->

}.

DF5 has an advantage over DF4 in that unlike DF4 it does not imply
that the counterpart relation is symmetrical, but also allows only

one counterpart per concept, per world.

(Cl),

(C2)

and (C3) are all

reasonable, given that counterparts are defined by DF5.
add nothing to the original system (except (Cl),

we define counterparts by DF5

,

(C2) and

We need to
(C3)) if

for the relation so defined is reflexive,

but neither symmetrical nor transitive.

It is difficult to decide

which, if any, of the definitions is the most Leibnizian in its treat-

ment of counterparts.

Our own choice is DF5, since DF5 incorporates

similarity in the definition, yet does not make the relation symmetrical
or transitive.

Perhaps we should view DF2 through DF5 as different

Leibnizian systems, corresponding to the systems S4, S5,
contemporary modal logic, respectively.

g

In Chapter III, certain things about Mates’

out and taken to be objections to his system.

note how

the.

B and T of

semantics were pointed

It would be well to

same objections fare against the system being proposed.

As it turns out, not one of the alleged difficulties holds in our

system.

One of the problems was the fact that in Mates (Ex)G Fx is

always false.

This will not occur in the current system, for if

'F'

stands for a property which is essential to some concept (in this world).
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then (Ex)OFx will be true (in this world).
in connection with the fact that (b)

sary truth.

(b),

OFa

Another problem arose
d[(Ex) x=a

->

Fa]

is a neces-

interpreted via Mates, is not something which
would

cause Leibniz any discomfort, and so interpreted
is true in our semantics
The problem was that (b) appeared to be a
translation of a sentence

which Leibniz would not accept, namely, "if it is
possible that Adam
has black hair, then necessarily if Adam exists,
then Adam has black
hair.

In the system presented,

(b)

does not turn out to be a necessary

truth as a general schema (i.e., it is not a necessary truth
for any

constant and any predicate)

Under DF2 (b) would be a necessary truth

.

for some a and F if the property of F is essential to the concept
of a.

fact,

Just as (b) is not a necessary truth, neither is

(c)

is false in the counterpart semantics,

D

(c)

for any constant

a..

But while

lJ (a=a)

since

O (a^a)
(a=a)

.

In

is true

is true for any constant a,

necessary identity is not a result of the system.

It might seem strange

to have a system in which a=a is a necessary truth, but if a=b,

then

it does not follow that a=b is a necessary truth, but one must remember

how formulas are being interpreted in the system.

When we say that a=a

is necessary, we are only saying that all of f(a)’s counterparts are

self-identical, but when we say a=b is necessary (assuming a=b)

,

we

are saying all of f(a)'s counterparts are identical, which is false.

This is because
if K f(a)f(a)

„

(a=b) is true (in this world) just in case (W^) (a)(8)

K f(B)f(b) then a=8 is true (in W^).

The antecedent

of the conditional does not restrict which counterparts of f(a) and

f(b) are to be considered.

That is, the counterparts being considered

do not have to be members of the same world, for reasons mentioned

119

earlier.

Thus even though f(a) is identical
to f(b), f(a) need not

be identical to f(B) as they may be
members of different worlds.

course if f(a) and

identical to f(B).

Of

are in the same world, then f(a)
will be

f (6)

However, explaining why the system does
not yield

necessary identity is not a justification for
its lacking necessary
identity.

All things considered it seems necessary
identity should

be a part of the system.

It can be easily added to the system by

changing (6) (vi) to the following:
(6) (vi)

If

is such that it contains n distinct constants
a ... a

\p

and no others, and
V($^ W_.)=T iff

(

W

) (

j

K f(B
f (3

x

)

n

)

f a

n

>

-

->

•••

)

$

then
(3

i

(i)(j)

= f(S,)]]}

Oi

is

$

L(l^i<A

V[ip(

a !/R)

3

n

)((K f(3
-

)

l<j <n)

...

(« n /3

1

->

n

),

f (a

)

[f(a

)

W]

= f(a.)

= T

-*

}

3

The addition of necessary identity to the system is not one which

yields any unintuitive results.

If f(a) is identical to f(b),

then

surely we would want the counterparts of f(a) to be the same as the

counterparts of f(b).

Necessary non-identity is not something we

would want, and does not follow from (6)(vi)".

If f(a)

is distinct

from f(b), then it seems it should be left open as to whether they

have any of the same counterparts.
is a member of W.
J

(where W

^ W
i

)

,

If f(a) is a member of W. and f(b)

then it should be possible that

j

there is a concept in another world,

such that that concept

(say) W
K.

is a counterpart of f(a) and f(b).

The system suggested for Leibniz does capture the Leibnizian

account of necessity and contingency presented in Chapter

IV.

It

avoids the objections Mates raises against using counterparts for
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Leibniz and at the same time avoids the difficulties
that Mates' own

system seems to have.

Leibniz did not have the use of modern
logical

techniques when he presented his views on necessity
and contingency,
and often he was writing only in response to
claims other philosophers

made, and not trying to present a complete theory.

This makes it

difficult to apply modern logical methods to Leibniz; one is
never

completely sure that in using such methods he has in fact captured

what Leibniz would have said had these methods been available.

Another

difficulty in presenting a system such as the one suggested in this
chapter is that Leibniz, as most great philosophers, occasionally

changed his mind on various philosophical issues throughout his career.

What we have attempted to do in a precise way is to present a solution
to the problem of contingency for Leibniz, which Leibniz suggests

but does not completely work out.

The solution we suggest is one

which does allow contingency in a very Leibnizian way, yet keeps
Leibniz's definition of truth intact.
as great as Leibniz,

When dealing with a philosopher

the most it seems one can do in a project this

size is to consider a problem which is central to his philosophy, but
does not account for all of his philosophy.

We hope to have shown

that there is a coherent way of understanding Leibniz which makes
a distinction between analytic and necessary truths in terms of counter-

parts and possible worlds, and hence allows for contingency.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

1*

presenting this material I assume that something is possible
just in case its opposite is not contradictory if God created
freely.

2.

This postulate suffers from being non-Leibnizian in important
respects.
For an attempt at a more Leibnizian treatment of
reflection and mirroring, see the appendix.

3.

Postulates vi) and vii) were suggested to me by Robert Sleigh Jr.,
and I am indebted to him for his comments and suggestions on
this material.

4.

I assume as Mates does that D, C(D), and G are all denumerably
infinite.

5.

I am indebted to Edmund L. Gettier III for many helpful discussions on Counterpart Theory and formal semantics in general, which
in part led to this system.

6.

I

am indebted to Michael Jubien who pointed out this difficulty

in an earlier version of this chapter.
7.

I would like to thank Fred A. Feldman, who pointed out this problem
Professor Feldman’s
in a different version of this chapter.
comments and criticisms on all aspects of this dissertation have

been greatly appreciated.
8.

and B are presented in G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell,
An Introduction to Modal Logic , Methuen and Co. , Ltd. , London, 1968.

9.

See pp. 110-111.

T,

S4,

S5,

APPENDIX

The Leibnizian idea of reflection and mirroring is actually
much

stronger than the idea presented on pages 99 - 106, which was sufficient
for deriving the results needed there.

The postulate of reflection

presented on page 101 should be a consequence of the stronger Leibnizian
notion.

Intuitively, a cic C reflects a cic D if, for any property

contained in D, it can be deduced that it is contained in D from

C.

In this appendix we attempt to present a precise account of the Leibnizian

idea of mirroring and reflection using the notions presented on pages
19 and 20 and language ALPC.
$ is a

sentence of ALPC if and only if

$

is a closed wff of ALPC.

We introduce a new language, ALPC' which is just like ALPC, except
for the following:
is a wff of ALPC' iff either (i)

$

is a one-place predicate

of ALPC followed by one term, or (ii)

if $ is a wff of ALPC',

$

then (x)$ and

ALPC' iff

$

(Ex)$>

are wffs of ALPC'.

is a sentence of

$

is a closed wff of ALPC'.

ALPC' is just a part of ALPC, but a very interesting part for Leibniz.
Let P be the set of all properties, P

...

P

1

complete individual concepts, C^

...

C^.

f,

n

,

g,

and C the set of all
and h are all functions

as defined on pages 19 and 20, where the language being used is ALPC

Thus the domain of

f

.

is the set of all one-place predicates of ALPC.

For any set K of cics, S(K) is the set of sentences of ALPC' associated

with K.

That is, if K = {C

in
...

C

},

S(K) = h(g(C )) union h(g(C ))
2

1

We can now define "compossibility" "mirroring", and
,

union h(g(C )).

"possible world".

...
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Definitions
(DF1)

A set K of cics is compossible iff

(DF2)

A set K of cics is maximal iff for any cic C,

S (K)

is consistent.
C t

K then

K^{C)is not compossible.
(DF3)

A set W of cics is a possible world iff W is a maximal

corn-

possible set of cics.
(DF4)

A cic C reflects

a cic D iff

and for any ALPC^ wff

x|$]3

e

S

(D } ),

$

(Ea)(E£)f(a) = C and f(g) = D

containing one free variable x, if

then there is an ALPC" wff

one free variable y such that y
(DF5)

A cic

C

[$

3/x

„

i|/|a

(J;

e

containing
_V(

{C

m irrors a possible world W iff for any cic

}

)

.

D, D e

W

then C reflects D.

Axioms
I.

II.

(DF4)

For any cic C, there is a possible world W such that C

For any cic C, if C

e

e W.

W then C mirrors W.

is designed to capture Leibniz's idea of reflection.

Every concept

is supposed to "express" all the other concepts in the same world.

I

understand Leibniz to be saying that from the concept of (say) Adam,
not only can we deduce all of Adam's properties, but we can deduce all
of Eve's properties, all of Leibniz's properties, and so on for anyone

in the x^orld.

If the concept of Adam reflects the concept of Eve and

the concept of Eve contains the property of having brown hair, then on
(DF4)

hair.

it follows that the concept of Adam contains Eve's having brown

To see this, let f(e) be the concept of Eve, f(a) the concept of

Adam, and f(x[BRx|) the property of having brown hair.

The set of

sentences associated with the concept of Eve contains, among other
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things,

St

[BRx e.

Given that the concept of Adam reflects
the concept

|

of Eve,

the set of sentences associated with the
concept of Adam will

include *[BRe

*

y]

where

a

f(*[i|»])

is some property that is included

in the concept of Adam.

The theorems that can be derived from (DF1)

through (DF5) and Axioms

I

and II are analogous to those which can

be derived using the definitions, postulates, and axioms
presented
on pages 99 through 106.

For example, one of the theorems will be

that each cic is a member of only one world.

The proof of this theorem

is somewhat complicated but can be shortened by acceptance of a theorem

which upon reflection will seem obviously true.

First some helpful

abbreviations:

the set of all sentences

2

|_$

D a

|

3

S(

e

(L3)

£ [$ ( 3 )

„

L3 and

\p

{

L3 (where

f (3

),

) }

where

(where a and
iJj]

e

S

{

(

3

f (a)

is some constant)
$ is a

is

wff containing one free variable x.

3

are constants) is the set of all sentences

}

)

where $(3) is a sentence such that &|$ x /s]s

e

is a wff containing one free variable x.

Theorem

1:

For any set H of sentences of ALPC^ and any constants

a and 3,

if H union Da(L3) is consistent,

then H union L3 is

consistent.

We leave this theorem unproved, but one can intuitively see why it holds.
That is because, in effect, L3 is a subset of Da(L3).

Using this theorem

we can prove that each cic is a member of only one world.
Suppose not; i.e., suppose there is a cic C such that C
C e W'

where W and W' are both possible worlds and W ^ W".

there is at least one cic D a member of one,
C

reflects D by Axil and (DF5)

such that

f

.

(a)=C and a constant,

e

W and

(say) W, and not the other.

there is a constant,

(say) a,

(say) b, such that f(b)=D.

Since D

Thus,

W%

Since W /

£

VT
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and W' is a possible world it follows that

W'U

{D} is not compossible.

Thus, S(W'U{D}) is inconsistent, and S(W')V S({D})
is inconsistent.
It also follows that S(W') union Lb is inconsistent,

Lb is a subset of

S

(

(D } )

,

since, although

for any sentence $ of ALPC' in

is a sentence equivalent to

in Lb.

<1

S

(

(D

>)

there

This can be seen if one considers

that the only sentences in S((D}) but not in Lb are sentences of the

form

r

Fb' where F is a one-place predicate of ALPC.

sentence of the form

r

Fb^

in

S

(

{D })

,

Yet for each

a sentence of the form

will occur in Lb and the two sentences are equivalent.

r

x[Fx"|b'

Since C

1

e

W',

Da(Lb) is a subset of S(W^), hence S(W^) union Da(Lb) is consistent.
If S(W")

union Da(Lb) is consistent, then S(vO union Lb is consistent,

by Theorem

1.

But this contradicts what was said earlier, namely

S(W^) union Lb is inconsistent.

Thus, every cic is a member of only

one world.

The notion of reflection presented here is much more powerful
than the one presented on page 101.

It also seems more Leibnizian.

However, the view is only a suggestion, and not all the details have

been worked out.

The problem of understanding Leibniz's view of

reflection is an interesting one which will certainly have future

consideration in the literature on Leibniz.
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